Good night, and good luck: perspectives on luck in management scholarship by Liu, C & de Rond, Mark
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rama20
Download by: [University of Cambridge] Date: 04 April 2016, At: 04:20
The Academy of Management Annals
ISSN: 1941-6520 (Print) 1941-6067 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rama20
Good Night, and Good Luck:
Chengwei Liu & Mark De Rond
To cite this article: Chengwei Liu & Mark De Rond (2016): Good Night, and Good Luck:, The
Academy of Management Annals, DOI: 10.1080/19416520.2016.1120971
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19416520.2016.1120971
Accepted author version posted online: 23
Nov 2015.
Published online: 27 Jan 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 147
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Good Night, and Good Luck:
Perspectives on Luck in Management Scholarship
CHENGWEI LIU*
Warwick Business School, University of Warwick
MARK DE ROND†
Judge Business School, Cambridge University
Abstract
It is not insignificant that seminal contributions to management scholarship
have highlighted luck as an alternative explanation for performance differences
between individuals and organizations. Yet it has rarely taken center-stage in
scholarship. The principal purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic
review of the application of luck in the management literature and in such
foundation disciplines as economics, sociology, and psychology. Our analysis
finds five common perspectives on luck: (a) luck as Attribution; (b) luck as
Randomness; (c) luck as Counterfactual; (d) luck as Undeserved; and (e)
luck as Serendipity. We outline various ways in which research on luck may
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be advanced along each of these perspectives, and develop an underexplored,
sixth, perspective on (f) luck as Leveler to provide a possible solution to
such issues as social inequality and (unwarranted) executive compensation.
Introduction
“Good night, and good luck” is how controversial US journalist Edward
R. Murrow would routinely sign off his 1950s television broadcasts. Given the
lateness of the hour, the former is understandable, but why the latter? Why is
it that we wish each other good luck? Perhaps it is because, after all is said and
done, we remain firm in the belief that good intentions and hard work may
not suffice to bring about a desired result. That ours is an unpredictable world.
Despite their best efforts, individuals and organizations can find it difficult to
predict the consequences of their initiatives. When assuming good intentions,
how else are we to account for the corporate duds that regularly headline the
popular press? Even with the benefit of hindsight, those studying organizations
can find it difficult to supply robust, comprehensive explanations for their
success. For why is it that some succeed where others fail, or succeed more
often, and for longer, than others do? To this question—arguably the central
in management scholarship—one finds various explanations. The more familiar
of these include exchanges between Mintzberg and Gould on Honda’s success
with the Supercub motorcycle (Mintzberg, Pascale, Rumelt, & Goold, 1996),
and on the importance of industry for firm success between McGahan and
Porter (2002) on the one hand, and Rumelt (1991) on the other. Whereas
Rumelt highlighted the predominance of random variations at the macro
level, Mintzberg makes the point that luck had to be an important part of the
explanation at the micro level (for Honda). Both accounts join a steady line of
scholarly contributions in the management literature that explicitly referencing
luck as an explanation for performance differences (e.g. Alchian, 1950;
Aldrich, 1979; Arthur, 1989; Barney, 1986; Cyert & March, 1963; Denrell,
2004; Denrell, Fang, & Liu, 2015; Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Levinthal, 1991;
Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Porter, 1991; Starbuck,
1994). Yet such references remain the exception to the rule: a review of the
use of luck in six leading management journals (Academy of Management
Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly,
Management Science, Organization Science, and Strategic Management
Journal) finds that only 2% of articles included the word “luck” in the main
text, abstract or title (see Table 1). And the reasons for this may not be hard
to find. After all, how is one to operationalize—let alone draw practical impli-
cations from—something as, well, fickle and haphazard as luck?
To not have referenced luck explicitly does not also mean that management
researchers have discounted its importance. Occasionally they have used
alternative constructs to acknowledge something quite similar. Where luck is
2 † The Academy of Management Annals
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referenced, its meaning can vary widely. For some, it is the unexplained var-
iances that lack pragmatic value (Porter, 1991). As Barney (1997, p. 17)
writes: what prescriptive advice can we give to managers given that the role
of luck is important, “that they should ‘be lucky’?” For others, luck is essential
for explaining performance differences because randomness in structured
environments can produce systematic patterns (Denrell, 2004; Denrell et al.,
2015; Henderson, Raynor, & Ahmed, 2012; Levinthal, 1991). Still others
argue that while good and bad luck can happen to anyone, some are more pre-
pared than others (Dew, 2009; de Rond, 2014), for example, by being mindful
enough to rebound from bad luck (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006), or by securing a
higher “return on luck” (Collins & Hansen, 2011). Some even argue that others’
systematic underestimation of luck can signal profitable opportunities (Denrell
& Liu, 2012; Lewis, 2003; Mauboussin, 2012; Powell, Lovallo, & Fox, 2011;
Taleb, 2001).
The primary purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic review of the
use of luck in the management literature, and in such related disciplines as
economics, sociology and psychology on which management scholars fre-
quently draw. This review will identify and unpack five distinct interpretations
of the role of luck: (a) luck as Attribution; (b) luck as Randomness; (c) luck as
Counterfactual; (d) luck as Undeserved; and (e) luck as Serendipity, before
adding a sixth: (f) luck as Leveler. Each perspective is closely tied to a particular
literature that entails as yet unsolved puzzles that suggest promising directions
for future research. For example, while prior studies in psychology uniformly
suggest that people tend to mistake luck for skill when evaluating performance
differences (Baron & Hershey, 1988; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982;
Langer, 1975; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Rosenzweig, 2007; Ross & Nisbett,
1991), recent studies point at an asymmetry in the evaluations between suc-
cesses and failures (Denrell & Liu, 2012; Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003;
Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015). While people appreciate the role of
(bad) luck in failures, they do not necessarily do the same when it comes to
explaining success. Explaining this asymmetry has important implications
for organizational learning, executive compensation and responsibility allo-
cation. Moreover, a common theme among these perspectives is that
people’s systematic underestimation of (good) luck tends to create a positive
feedback loop for only a select few that end up taking all the credit for achieve-
ment, for having created opportunities and accumulating wealth even when
undeserving (Bebchuk & Fried, 2009; Frank & Cook, 1995; Lynn, Podolny,
& Tao, 2009). This suggests an underexplored perspective on luck as Leveler
that might help attenuate such problems as exacerbating social inequality
and unwarranted executive compensation. We will elaborate on these, and
on other relevant, examples.
The paper is structured in three sections. First, we examine how luck is typi-
cally used in management scholarship, and in such “root” disciplines as
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psychology, sociology, and economics. Based on this review, we outline a poten-
tial research agenda for each of the perspectives on luck we identify.We conclude
by examining similarities and differences among these perspectives and elaborate
their implications for management research and also teaching.
What Is Luck?
The New Oxford Dictionary of English (NODE) defines luck as: “good or bad
things that happen to you by chance, not because of your own efforts or abil-
ities”. Implied in this definition are three characteristics. First, luck is a psycho-
logical attribution people use to respond to observed events (Hewstone, 1989;
Kelley, 1971; Weiner et al., 1971). That is to say, people are likely to attribute an
event to luck if they consider that the event happened by chance or randomly
(de Rond & Thietart, 2007). Second, attributing an event to luck implies that
the event has a salient evaluative status, which can be either “good” or
“bad”. Whether luck is “good” or “bad” is beholden to the observer: it is sub-
jective and context dependent (Rescher, 1995, p. 32). Third, whether luck is
“good” or “bad”, or plays any role at all, often depends on when one takes
stock. As time passes, and with the unfolding of events, one’s assessment of
luck can change dramatically (Rescher, 1995). The same event may be inter-
preted differently depending on the information available, the situation in
which the explanation is offered, or the motivation for providing the expla-
nation (Runde & de Rond, 2010). To illustrate, imagine the unpalatable: a
car crash with multiple casualties. Let us assume that an exhaustive subsequent
investigation finds the crash to have been a freak accident, meaning that chance
played an important role. In terms of our definition, the scenario fits the three
characteristics. The crash lacked obvious intentional design. Also, it produced
salient outcomes that can be evaluated insofar as several people losing their
lives, and others their relatives. And it is also true that the crash needs not
necessarily be attributed to bad luck. Consider that A is a person who died
in the crash, B is a person who would have involved in the crash if he was
not delayed by a call and thus had a narrow escape, and C, a person who
was not directly involved in the crash and is the unfaithful wife that A was
going to divorce. A, apparently, can be considered unlucky to have died in
this accident. B can be considered lucky to have avoided the crash, even if B
may have initially thought himself unlucky to have been delayed. C is unfortu-
nate to lose her husband in the crash, but if she is now able to inherit all her
dead husband’s property, which she would not have been entitled to after
divorce, perhaps she (and her lover) might be considered lucky. Perceptions
of luck associated with the same crash can be interpreted wholly differently
and illustrates the third characteristic of luck attribution: luck attribution is
always subjective and can change according to the information available and
with a better understanding of the motivations behind the attribution.
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The definition of luck used in this paper is consistent with the NODE and
aforementioned three characteristics of attribution. The purpose of the analysis
that follows is to show how the application of luck in the current management
literature can broaden and enrich our understanding of how the interactions
between chance, context and human interventions are relevant to management.
We proceed by outlining five common uses of luck: (a) luck as Attribution; (b)
luck as Randomness; (c) luck as Counterfactual; (d) luck as Undeserved; and (e)
luck as Serendipity, before adding a sixth: (f) luck as Leveler.
Five Perspectives on Luck in the Management Literature
Luck as Attribution
According to Attribution Theory (Hewstone, 1989; Kelley, 1971; Weiner et al.,
1971), people tend to attribute observed outcomes to four possible factors: skill,
effort, task difficulty and luck. Consistent with our dictionary definition, people
are more likely to attribute an observed outcome to luck when the cause of the
outcome is considered to be external, unstable, and uncontrollable.
Attribution biases are the focus of “luck as attribution” in the management
literature. For example, when evaluating own performances, self-serving bias
suggests that people tend to attribute their successes to skill or effort and con-
sider failures to be bad luck (Miller & Ross, 1975). Such attributions can lead to
over-learning from successes and under-learning from failures, resulting in an
illusion of control (Langer, 1975) and overconfidence (Camerer & Lovallo,
1999; Hogarth & Makridakis, 1981). People are also notoriously incompetent
in interpreting outcomes that involve randomness. For example, both the
“gambler’s fallacy” and the “hot-hand fallacy” suggest that people hold illusory
beliefs that a random sequence entails a pattern (Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Gilo-
vich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Moreover,
instead of seeing luck as an external, random element, people often interpret
luck as a personal characteristic (Darke & Freedman, 1997; Maltby, Day,
Gill, Colley, & Wood, 2008), and believing it can be manipulated (Tsang,
2004a, 2004b).
Attribution biases are also prevalent when evaluating others’ performances.
People tend to evaluate a decision based on its realized outcome rather than the
quality and situations at the time the decision was made (Baron & Hershey,
1988). Partly as a result of the Halo Effect (Rosenzweig, 2007), executives
whose decisions resulted in success are treated as heroes and those who
failed as villains even when their decisions are identical (Dillon & Tinsley,
2008). Such an underestimation of the role of luck is consistent with the Fun-
damental Attribution Error, or the tendency of people to over-attribute out-
comes to dispositional factors such as skill than to situational factors such as
luck (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Moreover, selection
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bias suggests that people tend to under-sample failures and focus on survivors
(Denrell, 2003). This implies that people draw lessons from “lucky” survivors
even when the lesson learned can be detrimental to future performance.
To ignore regression to the mean is another common bias when evaluating
observed performances. More extreme performances tend to be followed by
less extreme ones because extreme performance tends to be associated with
extreme luck and such luck is unlikely to persist, suggesting that future per-
formance should regress to the mean (Harrison & March, 1984). Yet people
appear unconvinced by statistical accounts of performance change. Instead,
they tend to generate their own causal explanations for such changes. For
example, regression to the mean suggests that poor performance is likely to
be followed by improvement whereas good performance is likely to be followed
by a decline. However, we tend to reward others when they perform well and
punish others when they perform poorly. This can lead to superstitious learn-
ing insofar as we may wrongly conclude that being nice to others can cause
decline and being nasty to others can cause improvement (Kahneman, 2011;
Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Nevertheless, these changes in performances
may only reflect regression to the mean that requires no causal explanation.
Future directions. The aforementioned attribution biases offer some
reasons for people’s misperceptions of luck. People are likely to underestimate
the role of luck (e.g. randomness and situational factors) in observed outcomes.
One possible reason for this bias is that people tend to apply cognitive shortcuts
by substituting a difficult question (e.g. what is the unobserved level of skill of
an executive) with an easy one (e.g. what is the observed level of performance of
an executive?) (Kahneman, 2011). Such substitutions can be a useful heuristic,
not only because they often save time and energy, but because they could be
correct (e.g. higher performers are likely to be more skilled) and thus entail
Ecological Rationality (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). That said, such substi-
tution should be avoided in that errors can be costly. This suggests at least three
questions to guide future research. First, when is it desirable to apply cognitive
shortcuts when evaluating performance differences? The answer to this ques-
tion will depend on the difference in cost between two possible errors: a
false positive (e.g. mistaking luck for skill) and a false negative (e.g. mistaking
skill for luck). As we have seen, attribution biases suggest that people tend to
err toward false positive errors when evaluating performance. This may
entail important motivational functions, for example, people maintain
esteem and appetite for taking risk when engaging in self-serving biases. By
contrast, a tendency to err on the side of false negatives implies inaction,
which is often more costly than action in evolutionary processes (Richerson
& Boyd, 2005). This suggests that we may be hard-wired to make more false
positive errors that, even if imprecise, are often useful. The difficulty is that
cognitive shortcuts that might have once been useful for our ancestors may
Good Night, and Good Luck † 7
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now lead to errors that are too costly to bear in modern societies. Think, for
example, of the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster, which resulted from evaluat-
ing lucky near-misses as successes (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008), or of financial
crises that resulted partly from rewarding analysts’ and traders’ luck (Hilary
& Menzly, 2006), or even of (dubious) entrepreneurial ventures which have
arisen from the tendency to misevaluate chance as successes (Lowe & Ziedonis,
2006; Shane, 2008). In sum, mistaking luck for skill may be a useful general
human attribution tendency but can lead to costly errors in today’s more
complex situations. Future efforts can focus on specifying the conditions
under which such biases can lead to undesirable outcomes before suggesting
remedies.
Second, how do aspirations interact with attributions about luck?1 Aspira-
tions play an important role in performance evaluations (Cyert & March,
1963). People adjust aspirations based on performance feedback and interpret
outcomes as successes (or failures) if current performance is above (or below)
such aspiration. Given that people tend to attribute success to skill and effort,
and failures to luck or circumstance, they are also more likely to attribute
outcomes to (bad) luck when entertaining high aspirations, because high
expectations are more likely to be followed by perceived failures and disap-
pointments. By contrast, low aspirations are likely followed by perceived suc-
cesses, and by the attributions that skill and hard work caused these successes.
Such asymmetrical attribution patterns can entail two processes: (a) people
with lower aspirations tend to improve their skill because they believe skill
matters in their successes, whereas people with high aspirations tend not to
improve their skill because they believe skill does not matter in their failures;
(b) over time the aspiration levels will likely converge because the improved
skill of the people who might initially have low aspirations will result in suc-
cesses that boost these aspirations in the future; the under-exploited skill of
those who might initially have high aspirations will result in more failures
that subsequently decrease their aspirations. In sum, people’s perceived suc-
cesses and failures depend on their aspirations, and different aspirations can
lead to asymmetrical luck attributions that have implications for subsequent
actions. These processes are just some of the many possibilities of how aspira-
tion can interact with attribution. Since successes and failures are rarely absol-
ute but depend instead on aspirations and social comparison (Cyert & March,
1963; Festinger, 1954), incorporating the role of aspirations in attributions
about luck is likely to be promising in any future research agenda.
Third, how are we to de-bias our misperceptions of luck? It may not always
be necessary to de-bias imprecise attributions that entail useful functions, but it
is desirable to help people resist the temptation of substituting a difficult ques-
tion with an easy one in cases when the error can be costly. Prior research has
suggested remedies for this, for example, by leading people to believe the stakes
are high (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008) or by encouraging an outside view (based on
8 † The Academy of Management Annals
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evidence such as statistics) instead of an inside view (based on intuition and
guts feeling) (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). Making people aware that they
are subject to attribution biases is necessary for all of these de-biasing tech-
niques to work, but arriving at an adequate level of understanding may be dif-
ficult in practice. People might come to understand, from first-hand
experience, that using intuitive attributions often works well (Hertwig,
Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004) and extend this technique to less familiar situ-
ations, but may find that applying their newly gained knowledge in different
situations leads to a much less positive outcome (March, 2006). Moreover,
the more uncertain the world becomes, the more people seek and rely on
apparently guaranteed solutions (Gimpl & Dakin, 1984). This suggests that
simple de-biasing techniques are unlikely to convince people to deviate from
their intuitions. In accordance with recent research on “nudging” (Thaler &
Sunstein, 2008), instead of “changing mindsets”, it may be more effective to
“change context” in an effort to direct people’s decisions toward better out-
comes (Dolan et al., 2012). Nepotism in succession, for example, has been
shown to hurt family business performances (Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz,
2005). Recent study demonstrates that nepotism may result from “bad luck”
having been augmented in an asymmetrical process of impression formation
between family and non-family members (Liu, Eubanks, & Chater, 2015).
This suggests that de-biasing—or changing mindsets—may not suffice in alter-
ing nepotism. Instead, changing contexts by reconfiguring social ties, for
example, is more likely to be effective in addressing this challenge (Liu et al.,
2015). Future research should take into account how techniques of nudging
(or changing decision contexts) can complement conventional approaches of
de-biasing (or changing mindsets) to help people attenuate the undesirable
consequences resulted from (mis)perceptions of luck.
Luck as Randomness
A second use of luck in the management literature is to highlight the random
nature of behaviors in organizations and management (Starbuck, 1994). Even if
people have intentions, and make conscious (or non-random) choices based on
these intentions, studies show that outcomes can still appear to be dominated
by random processes. Below we discuss four main sources of randomness in
organizations.
First, organizational outcomes appear random partly because outcomes are
influenced by external events that managers have little control over (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978). Corporate success is influenced by the activities of competitors
(Hannan & Freeman, 1989), the government (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and by
external events such as fluctuations in exchange rates (Bertrand & Mullai-
nathan, 2001). An innovative firm might be unlucky and launch a product
“on budget and on schedule” only for this to coincide with a recession; a
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more favorable timing might have propelled this same product, and firm, to
success. As Bill Gates admitted “Our timing in setting up the first software
company aimed at personal computers was essential to our success . . . The
timing wasn’t entirely luck, but without great luck it wouldn’t have happened”
(cited in Mauboussin, 2012, p. 13).
A series of seminal studies on sources of variance in corporate profitabil-
ity (McGahan & Porter, 2002; Rumelt, 1991) illustrate the importance of
events beyond managerial control. Significantly, they find that as much as
half of variations in performance cannot be explained by firm or industry
attributes (McGahan & Porter, 2002). The unexplained proportion of var-
iance is larger, in most studies, than the proportion of variance explained
by any single factor. In some studies, the unexplained proportion is higher
than the sum of the variance accounted for by all of other factors
(McGahan & Porter, 2002). This implies that much of the variance in profit-
ability cannot be explained by the factors that tend to be the foci in strategy
textbooks.
Second, the outcome of carefully planned behavior would appear to be
random if choices were based on inaccurate forecasts or on an incomplete
understanding of means-ends connections. Empirical studies of forecasting
accuracy show that predicting important business outcomes is challenging
(Durand, 2003). The average absolute percentage error, that is, (forecast 2
outcome)/forecast, in forecasts of macro-economic quantities (e.g. inflation,
exchange rates, unemployment) by economists and analysts is about 20%
(Armstrong & Collopy, 1992). Forecasts about demand and product success
are even less accurate, with an average absolute percentage error of close to
50% (Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence, & Nikolopoulos, 2009). For fast-moving con-
sumer goods, such as movies and records, even the best methods have an absol-
ute percentage error of 70% (Lee, Boatwright, & Kamakura, 2003).
Forecast inaccuracy limits how much theories that emphasize persistent
firm differences can explain. If demand changes in ways that are difficult to
forecast, profitability will only be weakly persistent, even if firm capabilities
or costs are highly persistent. Forecast inaccuracy also partly explains why
firm growth is nearly random (Geroski, 2005). Capable but unlucky firms
who bet on the wrong product will not grow, while firms with weak capabilities
who happen to bet on the right products will, and this explains why growth
rates are almost random (Coad, 2009).
Third, the outcome of organizational decisions may appear random when
events are decoupled from the intentions of those who are supposed to be in
charge, and this will remain the case even in stable and predictable environ-
ments. Managers have less control over important determinants of competitive
advantage, such as culture and capabilities, than generally thought (Hambrick
& Finkelstein, 1987; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Managers may choose wisely
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among alternative strategies, but the strategy that is implemented may be very
different from their initial intent (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).
Realized outcomes may differ from intended ones because those imple-
menting firm strategy may have different incentives, may not understand
what is required, or believe they know better (Powell & Arregle, 2007).
Inertia is another reason why realized outcomes can differ from those
intended. Change programs with the aim of reforming practices and imple-
menting new routines often fail due to inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).
Even if organizations do manage to change, the environment may change
faster than organizations can adapt. The complicated nature of interactions
in organizations and markets can also lead to unanticipated consequences
(Perrow, 1984) and changes in one part of the organization may lead to
adjustments in other parts (Hannan, Po´los, & Carroll, 2003). Such indirect
effects may make the impact of any intervention difficult to forecast. Decision
processes and conflict within organizations can also lead to outcomes that are
neither understood nor intended (Aldrich, 1979; Cohen, March, & Olsen,
1972). Finally, people in organizations make mistakes that can have signifi-
cant effects. For example, two Harvard economists dramatically exaggerated
the negative impacts of a high debt ratio on GDP growth (Reinhart &
Rogoff, 2010). They later acknowledged a mistake with the Excel coding
they used which had “averaged cells in lines 30 to 44 instead of lines 30 to
49” (Herndon, Ash, & Pollin, 2014, p. 7), excluding five countries from the
analysis. Millions of people’s lives were impacted due to austerity measures
justified by this research.
Fourth, an important but often neglected source of randomness in business
is competition. Competition leads to randomness because it removes obvious
opportunities and equalizes expected returns. Samuelson (1965) provided the
first formal demonstration of how competition between skilled and rational
actors in financial markets can lead to randomly fluctuating asset prices
because of equalized returns. In efficient markets, prices reflect all available
information and only change when new information becomes available that
could not have been anticipated based on past data. Stated differently, prices
should only react to unexpected news. The implication is that price changes
will be unpredictable and uncorrelated over time, consistent with empirical evi-
dence. Stock prices are, largely, unpredictable (Fama, 1970). Empirical studies
of earnings announcement also show that stock prices mainly react to unex-
pected changes in earnings (Beaver, 1968).
Competition also leads to randomness due to strategic uncertainty. Even in
settings without uncertainty about external events, uncertainty will exist due to
the inherent difficulty of forecasting the moves of rational competitors
(Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2004). Consider, for example, the following entry
game: a firm can enter three different product markets: A, B, or C. There is
high demand for product A (with 100 consumers), moderate demand for B
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(30 consumers), and little demand for C (10 consumers). Suppose profitability
simply depends on demand and the number of firms joining a given market:
firms in market j will make a profit equal to demand divided by the number
firms in market j. There are 100 firms that contemplate entry and make
their decisions simultaneously. What market should they choose to join?
The decision depends on what the other firms will do, but what they actually
choose to do is likely to depend on their forecasts of what others firms will do.
The only equilibrium in this game is a mixed strategy: the probabilities of
joining markets A, B, and C are 100/140, 30/140 and 10/140, respectively.
This equilibrium ensures that expected profitability is the same in each
market and an important implication of such a mixed-strategy is that profit-
ability will vary randomly between different realizations of the game, even if
all players are rational and adhere to this mixed strategy equilibrium. This
simple game illustrates how competition introduces strategic uncertainty.
Even if there is nothing uncertain in the specification of the game (e.g. no
uncertain external events impact profitability), there is strategic uncertainty
that implies that profitability will vary, seemingly by luck, over time.
Future directions. Randomness is often an endogenous organizational
outcome produced by intentional actors. Since random processes can dominate
organizational phenomena, it is sensible to attribute their associated outcomes
to luck. Interestingly, this perspective on luck does not tie to a particular theory
in the management literature. Rather, the importance of randomness is high-
lighted in several different research streams, such as in decision-making
(Cohen et al., 1972), in evolutionary modeling (Nelson & Winter, 1982), in
studies of the distributions of firm growth rates (Geroski, 2005), and in
studies of diffusion (Salganik, Dodds, & Watts, 2006), CEO effects (Fitza,
2014) and competitiveness (Powell, 2003). While these contributions are not
directly connected, the recurrent theme of how randomness in structured
environment can produce systematic patterns qualifies a “random school of
thought in management” (for a review, see Denrell et al., 2015). Here we
discuss three directions for future research.
First, selection is an underexplored process that can increase the importance
of luck in outcomes. Selection tends to amplify randomness because it reduces
skill differences by removing weak competitors (Barnett, 2008; Barnett &
Hansen, 1996), therefore reducing the signal-to-noise ratio. March and
March (1977) argue that “almost random careers” are an expected consequence
of sorting in organizations that reduces the heterogeneity in skill among man-
agers, especially at the top. If only sufficiently skilled managers make it to the
next level, the difference in skills among managers who make it to the top will
be small. Unless the variability due to noise (e.g. resulting from external events
or unpredictable subjective performance evaluation) is also reduced, the pro-
portion of variance in performance due to unsystematic random variation
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will play an increasingly important role in selection processes (Thorngate,
1988). Similarly, if selection reduces the variability in firm productivity (Syver-
son, 2011), the proportion of variance explained by productivity will decline.
This implies that more extreme performances are associated with greater
degrees of luck, and that tougher selection criteria can lead to less qualified
actors being selected. Future research can also extend this line of research
and develop more effective selection mechanisms that depend less on luck, par-
ticularly for high-level executives.
Second, management researchers should incorporate randomness into
theory building in order to develop stronger null models when examining
hypotheses (Schwab, Abrahamson, Starbuck, & Fidler, 2011; Starbuck, 1994).
Explanations relying on randomness might seem unfalsifiable: one could
always claim that something was due to chance, so how could such a statement
ever be tested? By making parsimonious assumptions that there is no difference
among actors, these “naı¨ve models” usually make more rigorous and detailed
predictions than other theories (Schwab et al., 2011). Many theories in man-
agement only make point predictions about the sign of a coefficient in a
regression (e.g. we theorize that the effect of x on y is positive). Theories pos-
tulating randomness at the micro-level make predictions about the distribution
of outcomes, thus allowing more opportunities for the theory to be falsified.
This also implies that empirical analyses that can reject a naı¨ve model that
assumes no systematic difference among actors or firms can provide more rig-
orous support for management theories. Management researchers should take
randomness more seriously, particularly when luck dominates in phenomena
managers care about, such as mergers and acquisition, persistence in perform-
ance, and innovation.
Third, given the empirical support for random variation, and the wide range
of phenomena that have been explained by models relying on random vari-
ation (Denrell et al., 2015), it may be possible for randomness to go beyond
“naı¨ve models” and acquire a more prominent role in management theory.
In explaining an empirical regularity, a management scholar should consider
explaining this regularity as a result of random variation in a structured
system. In other words, it makes sense to start the search for an explanation
by developing a model relying on random variation. For example, in the
area of judgment and decision-making, Hilbert (2012) explored how a
model of randomness (as unbiased noisy estimation) could explain several
judgment regularities that had previously been attributed to cognitive biases
by developing a formal model from which all regularities could be derived.
Can a similar unifying formal framework be developed to explain regularities
in performance persistence, career development, firm size, risk taking, and sur-
vival? Chance models exist for each of these regularities (e.g. Denrell, 2004,
2008; Denrell & Liu, 2012; Denrell & Shapira, 2009; Geroski, 2005; Levinthal,
1991; March & March, 1977) but these separate models have not yet been
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integrated theoretically. Can a formal framework be developed from which all
of these regularities could be derived? Can identical assumptions about prob-
ability distributions be used, and ideally, the same parameter values? A unified
chance model to explain various phenomena central to the field of manage-
ment would seem a tantalizing prospect, and well within the realm of
possibility.
Luck as Counterfactual
Several management scholars have broadened the application of luck by
including consideration of counterfactuals (Durand & Vaara, 2009; March,
Sproull, & Tamuz, 1991). Thus, an event can be considered to be a matter of
luck if it only happens in the realized world but not in most possible counter-
factual worlds (Pritchard, 2005). That is, realized history is not necessarily effi-
cient (Carroll & Harrison, 1994) and can be considered as drawn from a pot of
possible histories (March et al., 1991). If one could rerun the draw, how likely is
it that an alternative history to that realized could be obtained (Tetlock &
Belkin, 1996)? If counterfactual simulations show that the realized history is,
in fact, an unlikely outlier in the distribution of possible histories, what actually
happened can be considered to be luck.
The analysis of counterfactual histories can be problematic because the
course of history is often sensitive to changes in initial conditions and these
changes can be augmented in a path dependent process (Denrell, Fang, &
Zhao, 2013; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Page, 2006). For example, observed per-
formance differences may seem to result from differences in skill rather than
luck. But if we consider the developmental process of skill, differences in
skill may be due to small differences in initial conditions, for example, as
being at the right place at the right time. An exceptional performer may be
better than any of her counterparts in realized history (i.e. what actually hap-
pened) but may not have been able to acquire those very skills in most other,
counterfactual histories (i.e. what could just as likely have happened). The
exceptional performer may be better than others but her acquisition of superior
skill can be attributed to luck (Pritchard, 2005; Pritchard & Smith, 2004;
Teigen, 2005), or situational factors (Frank & Cook, 1995).
Consider an example popularized by Malcolm Gladwell: Ice hockey is easily
the most popular professional sport in Canada (Barnsley, Thompson, & Barns-
ley, 1985). Many Canadian children aspire to become a professional hockey
player, but how can this be achieved? Research has found a robust empirical
regularity in the profile of Canadian professional hockey players: in every
elite group of hockey players studied, at least 40% were born between
January and March (Barnsley et al., 1985). This regularity seems to suggest
that those born between January and March are more talented at playing
hockey than the others and the secret of becoming a professional hockey
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player in Canada lie in birth dates (Gladwell, 2008). This example is actually
quite a useful illustration of how luck is amplified by path dependency. High
performers from each age group of hockey-playing Canadian children are
selected and groomed for inclusion at the next level. But there is a rule: the
cut-off age for each new hockey league is the 1st of January. This means that
those who are born in the first three months are older and likely to have
greater physical maturity than their peers in the same age class. They are
more likely to be chosen to play more often and at higher levels, where they
will have better teammates, better training, and more game experience
(Pierson, Addona, & Yates, 2014). Their advantage is not so much that they
are innately better at hockey, but only that they are older and stronger. Never-
theless, after a few years of this selection process and the advantages that come
from it, the players who are born in the first three months will likely end up
being better than their peers who may have had the potential to have been
as good or better.
In the aforementioned example, situational factors such as chance (in this
case the birth date of Canadian children) and context (selection and training
in Canadian hockey leagues) are likely to play more important roles than
skill in determining who ends up becoming a professional hockey player.
Both elements of chance and context are beyond the foresight and control of
Canadian children (but not their parents, of course, who have a reasonable
expectation of being able to plan the child’s conception). The initial slight
difference in birth dates, and thus physical maturity, can be augmented in a
path-dependent process and produce huge differences in eventual outcomes.
This is occasionally referred to as a “relative age effect” (Musch & Grondin,
2001). If history could be rerun with slight difference in the initial condition
(e.g. the age cut-off point is 1st of July instead), it is sensible to predict that
a large fraction of the current professional hockey players would have had to
settle in different career paths.
The aforementioned example suggests that luck can have enduring effects in
determining performance differences. The slight advantage gained due to
factors beyond one’s control is usually augmented in a path dependent, rich-
get-richer process, that is, a “Matthew Effect2” (Merton, 1968). Exceptional
performances may have little to do with initial levels of skill, but merely
reflect contexts where rich-get-richer dynamics are stronger. Similar processes
have been documented in a variety of research. For example, performance
differences can be considered a matter of luck in the context of wealth accumu-
lation (Levy, 2003; Samuelson, 1989), status hierarchy (Gould, 2002), technol-
ogy adoption (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985), cultural markets (Chung & Cox,
1994; Salganik et al., 2006), business competition (Lieberman & Montgomery,
1988) and even academia (Levitt & Nass, 1989; Merton, 1968). This research all
suggests that the eventual performance distribution can reflect an exaggerated
or even distorted initial skill or quality distribution due to luck (Lynn et al.,
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2009). Exceptional performers in these contexts should not necessarily impress
us because the winners are likely to have enjoyed early luck of the draw and
differences can be seen between alternative histories.
However, people’s perceptions do not necessarily reflect the role of luck for
at least two reasons. The first arises from the challenges involved in gaining the
materials that are necessary for constructing alternative histories. Perfect coun-
terfactual analysis is impossible if one cannot specify all of the initial conditions
that could have altered the course of history. This constraint makes counterfac-
tual analysis less practical. The second reason is due to the way people con-
struct alternative histories in retrospect. Consistent with hindsight bias
(Fischhoff, 1975), the realized history is more salient than others, making
people’s counterfactual imagination anchor in it and underestimate how his-
tories could have unfolded differently (Byrne, 2005; Kahneman & Miller,
1986; Roese & Olson, 1995). Instead of mentally simulating possible counter-
factual histories, people create positive or affirming stories that emphasize how
human intention and intellect trumps uncertainty and difficulty (March, 2010).
These positive stories offer their tellers and audiences a sense of identity and
practical lessons for future actions, despite the fact that they may not
provide the best reflection of what might have been: “a good story is often
less probable than a less satisfactory one” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982,
p. 98). These human-centric stories “can be seen as possibly reflecting elements
of human conceit about the role of human intention and intellect in human
behaviors” (March, 2010, p. 41). As a result, people often overestimate the
role of skill and underestimate the role of luck in their counterfactual imagin-
ations, mistaking luck for skill.
Future directions. To consider luck in terms of counterfactuals broadens
its application by considering how likely the realized history could have hap-
pened differently. By simulating the distribution of possible histories, a realized
history may be attributed to luck if most alternative histories could have
unfolded in very different ways. While offering a useful, normative approach
of conceptualizing luck, rigorous counterfactual analysis is often difficult
because one is unlikely to exhaust all initial conditions that could change the
course of history. On the other hand, the way people construct counterfactual
histories is often biased. We tend to focus on realized history, and do not con-
sider how things might have unfolded differently, and even when we do, the
focus is very much on how changes in human interventions rather than situa-
tional factors could have undone the outcomes. Although these mental simu-
lations can entail useful function of maintaining motivations and identity, they
do not necessarily accurately reflect reality. This suggests at least three direc-
tions for future research.
First, future research could examine the role of luck by enhancing the
effectiveness of counterfactual analysis. By computationally or mentally
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simulating the distribution of possible histories, one may be able to define
the degree of luck of a realized event. For example, if a risky alternative
would lead to bankruptcy in most imagined counterfactual scenarios, the
fact that it is actually realized as a lucky success should not entail attention
and rewards. But such a counterfactual analysis is not easy because control-
ling for all initial conditions and their interactions with path dependency is
difficult. Recent studies have suggested novel approaches to address this
challenge (Cornelissen & Durand, 2012; Durand & Vaara, 2009; Vergne
& Durand, 2009). For example, some have suggested a “contrast expla-
nation” approach: one should start by holding all causal factors constant
except the one of interest when developing alternative histories for an
event (Tsang & Ellsaesser, 2011). Another approach suggests that one
should start by relaxing key assumptions of existing explanations and
develop alternative histories in a more open-ended fashion (Alvesson &
Sandberg, 2011), in contrast to the lab experimental fashion of a “contrast
explanation” approach. These approaches all help to generate plausible
counterfactual histories more systematically. Management researchers
could apply them when analyzing management phenomena (MacKay,
2007), as has been done in the such fields as political science (Tetlock &
Belkin, 1996) and military history (Cowley, 2002, 2003), in order to
refine these approaches and enhance the understanding of the role of
luck played in management.
Second, failing to mentally simulate accurate alternative histories can be
costly. For example, a shared feature of many organizational disasters is the
high number of near-misses, successful outcomes in which chance plays a
role in averting failures, prior to actual disasters (Perrow, 2011; Starbuck &
Farjoun, 2005; Vaughan, 1997). These lucky outcomes are usually interpreted
as successes and people do not consider how the same managerial decision
could have led to a disaster, boosting a false sense of security and appetite
for risk taking (Madsen & Desai, 2010; Tinsley, Dillon, & Cronin, 2012).
Using an example from Dillon and Tinsley (2008, p. 1437):
On many shuttle missions before the Columbia disaster, foam debris
detached from the shuttle, but luckily never hit a highly sensitive
portion of the orbiter. Lacking an obvious failure, NASAmanagers inter-
preted the many near-misses as successes and accepted the detachment
of foam as an ordinary occurrence. What was originally a cause for
concern no longer raised alarms; deviance became normalized.
Chance averted failure in the cases of these near-misses, but did not with the
eventual disaster. Nevertheless, NASA managers interpreted near-misses as
successes and did not consider how near-misses might easily have turned
into disasters. Their perceived risk toward the foam-related problem was there-
fore lowered even if the statistical risk of the problem remained the same. More
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generally, near-misses signal the vulnerability of the underlying systems and
offer opportunities for organizations to fix the problem, but people’s biased
responses mean systems remain vulnerable and the potential for “normal acci-
dents” will remain (Perrow, 1984). In sum, the way people mentally simulate
alternative histories is problematic, particular for near-misses in interdepen-
dent systems. This suggests an urgent need to examine how to help people
to construct less biased alternative histories in order to improve their ability
to evaluate risk. Future research can examine whether encouraging people to
take an outside view (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993) or inducing people to con-
sider what might have been could help people evaluate near-misses and chance
outcomes in general more effectively.
Third, this perspective on luck offers a new angle on an old debate about
skill versus luck. Earlier studies have shown that rich-get-richer dynamics,
and chance elements, make performance unpredictable and lead to a weak
association between ability and success, implying that success is only a weak
signal of skill. But prior studies have not challenged the idea that top perfor-
mers are the most skilled and worthy of reward and imitation. More recent
studies show that the belief that the top performers are the most capable is
flawed because exceptional success usually occurs in exceptional circumstance
(Denrell & Fang, 2010; Denrell et al., 2013; Denrell & Liu, 2012). Top perfor-
mers have been shown to be lucky for having benefitted from rich-get-richer
dynamics that boosted their initial fortune. This implies that if history were
to be rerun, fortune is likely to befall others. Imitating the most successful in
realized history can lead to disappointment or even disasters. Even if one
could imitate everything that the most successful did, one would not be able
to replicate their initial fortune and path dependency. In contrast, less
extreme performances may be a more reliable indicator of skill. These
“second best performers” are likely to achieve similar levels of high, but not
the highest, performances in most possible counterfactual histories. There is
no rule for becoming the richest above a certain performance level because
achieving exceptional performance usually requires doing something different
or new and there can be no recipe for such innovation (Levy, 2003). The impli-
cation is that the more extreme a performance is, the less one can learn from it
because this realized outlier is more likely to indicate unreliability and could
likely have happened differently in alternative histories. This also implies
that many top performers should be dismissed and less extreme performers,
that is, the second best should be rewarded and imitated.
Luck as Undeserved
A fourth application of luck in the management literature centers around the
praise and blame associated with the unintended consequences of managerial
action.3 Realized outcomes are not determined solely by intentional design—
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uncontrollable and unpredictable factors can interfere and produce conse-
quences that are decoupled from intention. This suggests that good intentions
do not necessarily lead to good outcomes and vice versa. Nevertheless, layper-
sons tend to determine praise and blame primarily based on realized outcomes.
This thus creates a mismatch: well-intended actions or competent managers
are blamed for the failures outside of their control, while ill-intended actions
or incompetent managers are rewarded for achievements that were outside
of their control. Most of what falls within this category sees luck as the
residue of intentional design and focuses on how people and organizations
over- or under-reward/punish the actors for their good or bad luck. In particu-
lar, there are three lines of distinct literature that elaborates how managers can
receive undeserved blames or rewards.
The first line of literature relates to executive compensation, and specifically
how it is that executives can receive compensation well beyond what they
deserve. This is a central research topic in the literature of agency theory
(Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) because inappropriate incentive struc-
ture can distort the motivation of the executives (Milgrom, 1981). Two
common observations are that (a) executives are often paid for good luck
due to factors beyond their control, such as unanticipated foreign exchange
(Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001), and that (b) executives tend to be over-
paid—more than their current performances can justify (Bebchuk & Fried,
2009; DiPrete, Eirich, & Pittinsky, 2010; Wade, O’Reilly, & Pollock, 2006).
Research has suggested several reasons for the exaggerated executive compen-
sation. For example, top executives gain power over boards so boards conform
to the executives’ self-serving request of high pay (Bebchuk & Fried, 2009).
Also, executives are aware that they can be made scapegoats when performance
declines even when such decline is beyond their control (Boeker, 1992; Wier-
sema & Bantel, 2006). Requesting a high compensation package is as if buying
insurance for situations when they can be blamed for bad luck. Overall, this
research suggests that the extent of over-pay increases with executive levels
and many top executives’ performances cannot justify the high compensation
they receive. This can hurt the performances of the firm and create concerns
about trust and fairness, which is an important issue we will get back to in sub-
sequent section, when introducing an underexplored perspective on luck as
Leveler.
The second line of literature on “luck as undeserved” originates from phil-
osophy, and specifically “moral luck” in moral philosophy (Nagel, 1976; Pritch-
ard, 2006; Williamson, 1981). Moral judgments should never depend on luck.
After all, it is reasonable to expect people to take full responsibility for the con-
sequences of voluntary actions and not be blamed for actions and outcomes
that are beyond a person’s control. Yet, moral judgments often appear to be
influenced by luck and circumstances (Nagel, 1976).
Good Night, and Good Luck † 19
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
mb
rid
ge
] a
t 0
4:2
0 0
4 A
pri
l 2
01
6 
Consider two managers facing an identical business scenario—a go/no-go
case that requires a judgment call from them. They both feel that they have
conducted enough analyses and are abiding all the rules, and so both managers
decide to go ahead with the plan. In one case, purely by chance, this business
plan created an unanticipated, negative side effect that killed several people
while everything went well as planned in the other case.4 Normatively, one
should not blame one manager more than the other because the difference
in the consequences, however dramatic, is due to chance. But people tend to
judge otherwise—the former manager tends to be blamed and held responsible
for the casualties even when they are due to bad luck.
Why do we then blame people for their bad luck? Researchers in moral psy-
chology have proposed several explanations, all of which center around the
second-order inferences one might draw from unlucky incidences. For
example, the unlucky incidence that befell the first manager may indicate
false beliefs held by that manager (Young, Nichols, & Saxe, 2010). Both man-
agers “felt” they had done enough analyses to justify their decision. But perhaps
the bad outcome in the first case indicates that the analyses done by the first
manager was simply not rigorous enough. The first manager may have
omitted some important information and wrongly evaluated the safety pro-
cedure of the plan. So the bad luck the manager experienced would not have
been entirely beyond the manager’s control. Another possible inference
involves a judgment of the character of the manager based on observed out-
comes (Pizarro et al., 2003; Uhlmann et al., 2015). The motivation of moral
judgment is ultimately about judging others’ moral character—one should
avoid interacting with a person who is perceived to be immoral. The bad
luck the first manager experienced may be informative about character:
being reckless or imprudent, for example, means the manager deserves to be
blamed (Uhlmann et al., 2015). This is also consistent with the research on
the belief in luck—lucky or unlucky outcomes are associated with perceived
personal characteristics (Day & Maltby, 2003; Maltby et al., 2008). Overall,
research on moral luck suggests that people’s moral judgment is not neutral
to luck: laypersons as naı¨ve moralists tie their judgment to the consequences
and discount the role of luck and circumstances. Nevertheless, there is an
ongoing debate about the underlying mechanisms for such regularities in
moral judgment.
The third line of literature under this perspective on luck is about how it is
people evaluate executive accountability after extreme failures. Executives and
operators are often blamed for large scale failures (Perrow, 1984)—be they oil
spills, nuclear plant disasters, or financial crises—and expected to assume
responsibility and either resign or get fired. Prior studies on disaster dynamics
have emphasized the role of bad luck in failures: system failures can result from
exogenous factors hitting a fragile system. Systems may be so tightly coupled
that even small external shock can cascade and collapse the system due to its
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interactive complexity (Perrow, 1984). Consider again how the Columbia
Space Shuttle broke apart due to a piece of foam insulation happened to
strike its left wing rather than the other places in prior missions (Starbuck &
Farjoun, 2005). System failures can also result from endogenous processes.
Non-novel interruptions can cumulate to such extent that they create
additional interruptions faster than the executives in charge can fix existing
ones (Rudolph & Repenning, 2002), leading to inevitable system collapse
after passing a tipping point. For example, consider how the Tenerife Air Dis-
aster, the deadliest accident in aviation history, unfolded with several factors
such as terrorist attack, weather, airport capacity together exacerbating the
situation to such extent that the disaster was set in motion and beyond the
pilots’ control. Overall these studies suggest that situational factors—such as
system characteristics and external circumstances—are necessary for produ-
cing extreme failures. The implication is that failed executives do not deserve
to take all the blame—they may simply be in the wrong place at the wrong time.
Future directions. This perspective on luck emphasizes a mismatch: rea-
lized outcomes do not necessarily reflect intentions. Nevertheless, people
tend to judge the quality of the actor by outcomes. This suggests that some
individuals can be over-blamed for bad luck while others are over-rewarded
for good luck. In particular, top executives can to be over-compensated for
high performances beyond their control and over-blamed for disasters that
are also beyond their control. This creates problems not only for incentive
structure, but also for system robustness: unlucky executives are fired and
the system remain fragile, awaiting the next “normal accident” (Perrow,
1984). Moreover, management researchers also recognize the importance of
moral luck in business (Michaelson, 2008; Velamuri & Dew, 2010). One chal-
lenge is that most empirical research on moral luck is based on people’s judg-
ment on simplified scenarios like the above illustrative example: two similar
individual actions lead to very different outcomes and how people judge the
individuals differently based on small modifications of the scenarios. It is
not clear whether these findings are readily applicable for managerial contexts
where uncontrollable forces are often a combination of social influences and
incentive structure. Consider, for example, a case discussed by Arendt
(1963), of a German soldier who served in Auschwitz. He was following
orders to kill and torture prisoners as did most of his peers, and the cost of dis-
obeying the orders might well have been his own death. To what extent should
we blame him for his involvement in the Holocaust? Or consider a less extreme
example: if a manager goes ahead with a mission partly because of an appor-
aching deadline and the cost of missing such deadline is likely his job
(Perrow, 1984; Starbuck & Farjoun, 2005), to what extent should he be
blamed if the plan happens to go wrong? These are the sorts of difficult
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questions about moral luck that have not been addressed in management. But
there are three further directions for future research.
First, when should we blame executives for failure? Normal Accident
Theory (Perrow, 1984) suggests that failed executives tend to be over-
blamed. However, alternative theories have suggested that the persons in
charge should be blamed for extreme failures. Extreme failures can result
from cascading errors that are beyond the control of the executives. But
whether a cascade of errors is triggered is not entirely independent to the
executives’ skill. Clearly, poorly skilled executives can exacerbate the situations
and make system collapses more likely. Tightly coupled systems can still
perform reliably and be failure-free if the executives in charge are mindful
enough to overcome inertia and be resilient against the unexpected before
incurring additional damage (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). For example, the
Columbia Space Shuttle Disaster could have been averted had executives at
NASA paid attention to, rather than having normalized, deviances (e.g. the
broken foam insulation) and interpreted prior near-misses not as successes
but a cause for concern (Dillon & Tinsley, 2008; Vaughan, 1997). Overall
these studies on High Reliability Organizations suggest an important disposi-
tional factor—mindfulness (Langer, 1989)—is crucial for complex organiz-
ations with high-risk technologies to continue performing at a highly reliable
fashion (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). The implication is that failures
are informative about skill—the failed executives are likely to be the mindless
ones who easily succumb to inertia and enable cascading errors to happen in
the first place.
Taken together, this literature adds an important consideration when eval-
uating the extent to which failed executives deserve to be blamed: the inter-
actions between the scope for skill and luck. If cumulated failures do not
diminish the scope for skill, this suggests that higher skilled executives are
more likely to exercise their skill and stop failures from escalating. In this
case, a failure is informative about low skill and the failed executives deserve
to be blamed. In contrast, if the exacerbated situations can diminish the
scope for skill because cascading errors overwhelm managerial interventions,
eventual failure is not informative about skill. Rather, it indicates the system
is likely to be tightly coupled and sensitive to external shocks and small
errors. Failed executives cannot be blamed here because, however skilled
they might be, they could not have averted failure. In particular, the magnitude
of the extreme failures should not be proportional to the blame the failed
executives receive when small errors can cascade and override skill—the mag-
nitude indicates more about the system characteristics. The interaction
between skill (e.g. mindfulness and resilience) and luck (e.g. exacerbating situ-
ations like cascading errors) goes beyond the simple scenarios discussed in the
moral luck literature and should attract more attention from management
researchers.
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Second, recent studies suggest an interesting asymmetry in both moral judg-
ment and performance evaluations. In moral judgment, people tend to dis-
count blame to bad outcome but not praise to good outcome (Pizarro et al.,
2003). Similarly, people tend to appreciate the role of bad luck for extreme fail-
ures but not the role of good luck in exceptional performances (Denrell & Liu,
2012). A second order inference process may account for this asymmetry: most
people assume that others do (not) want to experience good (bad) luck, or put
themselves in a situation that would increase (decrease) exposure to good (bad)
luck. This suggests that they discount the blame associated with failure because
it is against that person’s “meta-desire”. By contrast, people do not discount the
praise associated with success because that is consistent with that person’s
“meta-desire” (Pizarro et al., 2003). While this account is theoretically
sound, more empirical and experimental work is needed to examine the
reasons for such asymmetry, which has potentially important implications
for incentive structure and executive accountability.
Third, when should we reward success? It is sensible to reward higher-
achieving performers when performance is a reliable indicator of skill and
effort (Fama, 1980; Milgrom, 1981). Otherwise higher-achieving performers
are rewarded for their good luck because their performances depend more
on situational rather than dispositional factors. Nevertheless, rewarding luck
is a common business practice, particularly for the corporate elite (Bertrand
& Mullainathan, 2001). On one hand, the difference in skill among the corpor-
ate elites is likely to be tiny (March & March, 1977), implying that their suc-
cesses and failures are more likely to result from situational enablers or
constraints. On the other hand, people chase a romanticized perspective on
these stars (Khurana, 2002; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985), even when
star performances are highly likely to result from uncontrollable factors (Ber-
trand & Mullainathan, 2001; Strang & Macy, 2001). In fact, the supposed top
performers can be expected to be less skilled than their lower performing
counterparts when extreme performances indicate unreliability such as exces-
sive risk-taking or cheating (Denrell & Liu, 2012). This implies a large discre-
pancy between people’s romanticized perspective on how corporate elites are
responsible for firms’ destiny and the reality of how luck dominates the per-
formances beyond a certain level.
Moreover, the exaggerated high compensation of top executives creates pro-
blems for redistributive justice and endangers the stability of societies. In par-
ticular, it hurts the belief in a just world. Belief in a just world is closely related
to perceptions of the extent to which outcomes should be attributed to luck
(Alesina, Glaeser, & Sacerdote, 2001). It is often an illusion to believe that
the world is just. To work hard, for example, does not guarantee the payoff
one deserves when outcomes are largely determined by social connections
and inherited wealth (Piketty, 2014). Such an illusion often entails desirable
outcomes because of a self-fulfilling prophecy: those who believe luck
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matters less will be motivated to work harder (Benabou & Tirole, 2006;
Gromet, Hartson, & Sherman, 2015). Research shows that belief in a just
world is a prevalent illusion (with notable differences between countries)
and can explain why GDP growth is higher in the USA (which underestimates
luck more) than in many European countries (which underestimate luck less)
(Alesina et al., 2001). However, such misperceptions can backfire: Alesina et al.
(2001) also show that underestimating luck leads to less social spending in the
USA. If the majority believes that luck matters less and one should be respon-
sible for one’s own fate, social spending like expenses on medical care is likely
to be lower, potentially decreasing social mobility and strengthening social
inequality. This in turn can lead to social instability because beyond a
certain threshold of social inequality more people will come to realize that
the world is less just than they believed. The exaggerated pay to the executives
and bankers, particularly after the financial crises strengthen this impression as
the demonstrations such as “Occupy Wall Street” would appear to suggest.
There may be some rational accounts for why high executive compensation
is useful, but executives should also consider the consequences of their high
compensation packages for society, lest they should decide to react to such
felt injustice in more radical ways. Overall, this discussion suggests that
rewards for higher ranked corporate executives should be proportionally less
because luck plays a more important role in performance at higher levels in
corporations. Otherwise the high compensation of top executives is not only
unjustifiable but hurts the belief in a just world and increases instability in
societies.
Luck as Serendipity
A fifth usage of luck in the management literature emphasizes why some people
and firms are luckier than others, or how “chance favors the prepared mind” as
Louis Pasteur put it. Good andbad luck befalls to all, but only some canmaximize
the return on luck. The focus is not on chance or luck per se, but on individual or
firms’ traits that make them to be able to see what others do not see, a form of
“serendipity”. Before we elaborate the role of serendipity in management
context, we introduce its origin, which is a closer correlate of creativity, and
often associated with scientific breakthroughs and such lucky industrial discov-
eries as Velcro, X-rays, aspirin, Post-It Notes, the HP Inkjet printer and
Scotchguard.
The origin of serendipity. Serendipity has its etymological origins in a six-
teenth-century tale told in a letter, sent by Horace Walpole to a distant cousin
on 28 January 1754. In it, three princes of Serendip (present-day Sri Lanka),
sent by their father to fend for themselves so as to gain practical knowledge
of the world, happened upon a camel owner, distraught for having lost his
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precious asset. He inquired as to the whereabouts of his camel. While the
princes had not seen the camel, they were able to render an accurate descrip-
tion of it: it was blind in one eye, lacking a tooth and lame, was carrying butter
on one side and honey on the other, and was being ridden by a pregnant
woman. Their description was accurate enough for the camel owner to
become suspicious. He took them captive and delivered them to the
emperor. Upon interrogation it became clear that the description of the
camel had been deduced from observation alone. They explained that they
thought the camel blind in the right eye because the grass had been cropped
only on the left side of the road. They inferred that it was missing a tooth
from the bits of chewed grass scattered across the road. Its footprints
seemed to suggest that the animal was lame and dragging one foot. Also,
finding ants on one side of the road and flies on the other, they concluded
that the camel must have been carrying butter on the ant’s side, and honey
on other. Finally, as for the presence of a pregnant woman, a combination
of carnal desires on the part of the princes, and imprints of hands on the
ground sufficed to bring about this final conclusion (Merton & Barber, 2004).
Walpole’s tale is instructive because the princes relied on creativity in
recombining events (that came about by chance or happenstance) and in exer-
cising practical judgment to deduce “correct pairs” of events so as to generate a
surprisingly effective (and, as it happens, entirely accurate) plot (de Rond,
2014). In contrast to other perspectives on luck, serendipity points toward a
distinct capability, namely that of recombining any number of observations
so as to deduce “matching pairs”, or sets of observations, that appear to be
meaningfully related (de Rond & Morley, 2010). Serendipity is the “prepared
mind” in Louis Pasteur’s oft-cited quip, and the question one of how organiz-
ations, and the individuals inside them, can increase the likelihood of serendip-
ity occurring. This may be what Porter (1991, p. 110) had in mind when
suggesting that “there are often reasons why firms are ‘lucky’”.
A closer examination of serendipity also suggests a typology (de Rond,
2014). A first distinction is that between “true” and “pseudo” serendipity,
where one seeks A but finds B, and where B is ultimately the more highly
valued. When it came to the Nobel prize winning discoveries of PCR and
DNA, Mullis and Francis and Crick, respectively, found what they were
looking for but by way of chance. In each case, the objective remained
unchanged, but the route toward achieving this objective proved unusual
and surprising.
Crick and Watson’s discovery of the “double helix” structure of DNA
was marked by various unplanned events such as Watson’s loosely
related work on TMV (corroborating their suspicions of a helical struc-
ture), and exchanges with Griffith and Donohue (in directing them
toward the specific, but unorthodox, pairing of bases). Yet they always
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knew that they were after the structure of DNA, believing it to contain
the secret of life. Thus, DNA illustrates pseudo-serendipity, insofar as
chance events enabled the unraveling of the molecule, yet these events
never caused them to deviate from this original target. (de Rond, 2014,
p. 10)
In pseudo serendipity, A is sought and A is found, but via a route quite
different from that originally envisioned (Roberts, 1989). Thus, in the discov-
eries of sildenafil citrate (the key ingredient in Viagra) and penicillin, scientists
discovered something else than what they had been looking for (cf. de Rond &
Thietart, 2007).
Both Fleming and Pfizer’s scientists applied creativity and practical judg-
ment in matching observations of unforeseen events with findings
reported by others, and in selecting which of these combinations
might be fruitful. They rightly interpreted coincidences as meaningful
in the context of the knowledge available to them at the time.
However, the particle from the mycology labs wafting through Alexan-
der Fleming’s open window to contaminate a bacterial culture is a
random variation, as were the unusual changes in temperature. By con-
trast, the unanticipated side effects of sildenafil citrate surfaced in part as
a result of research design; after all, toxicity trials tend to use men
between the ages of 18 and 30, as did Pfizer’s clinical trials. (de Rond,
2014, p. 10)
One can make a further distinction between chance as the unintended con-
sequence of research design, and chance as pure random variation (de Rond,
2014). Thus, in discovering sildenafil citrate and PCR, opportunities arose as
a direct consequence of the way the study had been designed: the unintended
side effects of sildenafil citrate became apparent precisely because Phase 1 clini-
cal trials use healthy male volunteers. Likewise, Mullis’ discovery of PCR relied
entirely on his recombination of existing technologies (de Rond, 2014, p. 10).
By contrast, penicillin and DNA benefited from random chance occurrences:
the spore in Fleming’s dish had most likely wafted in from the mycology
labs located one floor down. And Crick was fortunate to share his office
with a crystallographer, who pointed out the flaws in his original, “textbook-
correct”, model (de Rond, 2014, p. 10).
Serendipity in the context of management. In the context of management,
we can conceptualize how chance interacts with individual capability so as to
co-produce serendipity in four different ways (Austin, 1978). The first of these
refers to luck that cannot be attributed to the beneficiary in any meaningful
way. This application is a base-line case of luck as serendipity and is consistent
with the application of luck by Barney (1986). A firm’s performance is
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determined by the values created by the strategic factors the firm owns.
Superior performance is likely to be founded on the firm’s superior foresight
about the value of its strategic factors and from acquiring these factors
for less than they are worth. Otherwise there should be no abnormal
returns—any superior performance should be attributed to good luck
because profitability is ultimately traced to unexpected price changes. If
strategic factors are priced correctly, based on all of the available information,
price changes only occur when new, unexpected information becomes available
(Fama, 1970). Therefore, this is in fact the base-line case without serendipity—
gains should be attributed to pure luck or windfall that is independent of the
person.
The second variation of luck as serendipity is about how luck favors those in
motion—people who are willing to venture new ways to make progress. While
good luck may befall the lazy and inert, favorable outcomes are more likely to
be the result of hard work joined by chance events, or “practice and you get
luckier” (Burgelman, 2003). As Charles Kettering, former head of research at
General Motors, put it: “keep on going and the chances are you will stumble
on something, perhaps when you are least expecting it. I have never heard of
anyone stumbling on something sitting there” (as quoted in Austin, 1978,
p. 15). Moreover, the chance of success may be low and unforeseeable. But con-
tinuing to try will entail the exclusion of alternatives that would have led to
failure, enhancing the chance of success over time. The implication is that
experimentation matters and benefits can arise from exposing oneself to situ-
ations that increase the chance of realizing favorable outcomes.
The third variation of luck as serendipity is about how luck favors those who
look inward. Sometime people or firms can pre-adapt: happen to be endowed
with strategic factors that can be recombined into valuable, idiosyncratic stra-
tegic advantage (Cattani, 2005, 2006). The holdings of these valuable strategic
factors often result from unintended consequences. For example, Cattani
(2005) uses the case of Corning to illustrate how an unanticipated use of
fiber optics technology enabled Corning to become one of the leaders in
long-distance communications. Alternatively, some idiosyncratic strategic
factors can result from people opportunistic behaviors when dealing with
ambiguity and resource uncertainty (Miner, 1987). This implies that sustain-
able superior performances are more likely to result from an accurate under-
standing of firm-specific resources, even when these resources were acquired
by accident or opportunism (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990, 1994; Makadok &
Barney, 2001; Powell, Lovallo, & Caringal, 2006). By extending these unique
resources, firms are more likely to gain competitive advantages that cannot
be easily imitated by competitors (Wernerfelt, 1984).
Consider the case of Bill Gates, the founder of the software giant Microsoft
(as quoted in Gladwell, 2008, p. 55):
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If there were fifty [teenagers who had the kind of experience I had] in the
world, I’d be stunned . . . all those [opportunities] came together. I had a
better exposure to software development at a young age than I think
anyone did in that period of time, and all because of an incredibly
lucky series of events.
This series of lucky incidents Gates referred to (Gates, 1995) started with his
wealthy family sending him to a private school with computers (rare equip-
ment in the 1970s) and this allowed him to develop his hobby of programming
and develop a unique competence relative to his cohort and competitors. After
gaining superior competence, his mother’s connection to IBM’s then president
facilitated a contract with Gates’ startup. Bill Gates augmented all of this by also
deciding to decline the most apparently sensible alternative of attending
Harvard to start his own company, all enabled by the series of lucky events
he enjoyed. The success of Microsoft may seem lucky to many (including
Gates himself), because the company would not have been so successful with
slight changes in any of these aforementioned conditions. This application of
luck as serendipity focuses on the role of human intervention instead: the
fact that Gates understood the value of his unique capabilities and decided
to start business instead of going to Harvard is crucial for establishing the sus-
tainable superior performances of Microsoft. Stated differently, temporary
competitive advantage is possible by looking forward (e.g. forecasting the
trends), looking backward (e.g. drawing lessons from histories), working
hard or just being lucky. But sustainable competitive advantage is only possible
through looking inward, that is, by creating isolating mechanisms through
individualized resources and capabilities that cannot be easily replicated by
competitors.
A fourth variation of luck as serendipity is about how luck favors those who
are alert and flexible. Low-hanging fruits will be exploited quickly as Barney
(1986) and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970) suggest, but other
less obvious opportunities are likely to be left unexploited whenever the
market is not perfectly efficient. Favorable chance may happen to anyone
but only those who pay attention to weak signals and are capable of recognizing
and responding quickly to grasp opportunities (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003;
Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003). The ability to see what others do
not is the key to this application of luck, and it is this variation that most closely
reflects serendipity’s etymological origins. For example, executives of Honda
managed to successfully link information that seemed to distract them from
their original goal of promoting heavyweight motorcycles in the USA, and con-
cluded that light-weight motorcycles were the model to introduce in the US
market instead. This serendipity led to the extraordinary success in the USA
of its “Supercub” in the late 1950s (Mintzberg et al., 1996; Pascale, 1996).
The implication is that looking outward may be useful in addition to
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looking inward. Opportunities may exist even for those who do not yet possess
any valuable resource, for example, entrepreneurs (Dew, 2009), but can make
meaningful combinations of seemingly irrelevant factors that were omitted by
others.
Future directions. The application of luck as serendipity recognizes the
importance that luck plays in management, but emphasizes that certain
characteristics help some to recognize chance opportunities and grasp them
where others do not. This perspective on luck is consistent with a primary
purpose of management: to reign in randomness and gain more control over
outcomes. It is thus perhaps not surprising that many management researchers
do not use the term luck in their writing. Even when they do, the focus is not on
luck per se but on what managers should do to get lucky. This perspective on
luck also entails three directions for future explorations.
First, opportunities may exist when social dynamics discourage others to
exploit atypical opportunities—a behavioral source of market inefficiency.
Prior studies have suggested people feel more comfortable in conforming to
the majority (Asch, 1951) which aligns with the idea that the majority is
very often wise so following the crowd is sensible (Lorenz, Rauhut, Schweitzer,
& Helbing, 2011). However, majorities can be wrong. For example, Michael
Lewis in his book Moneyball (2003) documents how a stereotype of what
good players should look like biased scouts and coaches in Major League base-
ball. Opportunities thus existed for less resourceful teams who applied different
approaches (e.g. statistical analysis) to find undervalued players who could
contribute more than immediately suggested by traditional interpretations.
Around the turn of the millennium, the Oakland A’s managed to pay less
for players than their eventual contribution would suggest they were worth
and then resell their best performing players toward the peak of their
output. They benefited from this trading strategy because: (a) they were
better able to recognize the value of their players when buying and (b) other
teams paid more for these players than they might be worth when selling
them, reflecting how extreme performances are more likely to regress to the
mean in future seasons. Such a strategy led to a higher ratio of win rates relative
to salary costs than other teams and suggests that opportunities may exist but
are left unexploited because they seem atypical to many due to norms, biases,
peer pressure or misperceptions of luck (e.g. ignoring regression to the mean).
This implies that opportunities may be left unexploited when they seem atypi-
cal or when acting against the norm is risky. Future research can explore such
alternative sources of strategic opportunity that can result from misperceptions
of luck strengthened by social dynamics.
Second, who can grasp atypical opportunities when others are bounded by
norms or peer pressure? One possibility is that luck may favor those who are
less sensitive to what others think. For example, extreme failures may indicate
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that the system is tightly coupled and sensitive to external shock rather than a
lack of skill in executives (Perrow, 1984). The implication is that failed execu-
tives should not necessarily get fired because they may just be in the wrong
place at the wrong time. However, many executives who experience
extreme failures are fired and treated as scapegoats (Boeker, 1992; Wiersema
& Bantel, 2006). Opportunities may exist for those who dare to hire the failed
executives because they can be hired less than they are worth. Nevertheless,
companies who are sensitive to what stakeholders think are unlikely to hire
executives associated with failures, even when they understand that the execu-
tives are skilled but unlucky, often because there is no certainty that stake-
holders will be able to make this inference. More generally, opportunities
exist for those who can afford to implement a contrarian strategy. By
acting on accurate inference and against the crowd, the prizes can be more
substantial due to less competition. In this sense, fortune may favor the insen-
sitive—those who can afford to implement a contrarian strategy and act on
atypical inferences such as dismissing the most successful and hiring the
failed.
Third, how contextual factors enable serendipitous combinations deserves
more research. Applications of luck as serendipity mostly emphasize how
actors manage to see what others do not see. Other studies emphasize that
such serendipity should be attributed less to the actors and more to the
network structure the actors are embedded in. For example, using the
analogy of solving a puzzle, Simonton (2003) suggests that most important
scientific discoveries should not be attributed to a single scientist at a particu-
lar time, but to other scientists who discovered the pieces necessary to solve
the puzzle and to the network that enabled the eventually recognized scientist
to have accessed all of the pieces that were relevant to solving the puzzle.
Some studies in management and sociology also suggest the importance of
network structures in enabling innovation and its diffusion (Centola &
Macy, 2007; Fang, Lee, & Schilling, 2010; Granovetter, 1973; Schilling &
Fang, 2013; Small, 2009). More generally, detailed contextual analyses of ser-
endipitous outcomes tend to undermine the role of the “stars” involved and
instead suggest how situational factors play more important roles in enabling
the outcomes. This line of research thus undermines the role of actors and
emphasizes the role of situational factors such as networks in serendipitous
discoveries. Future research can extend this line of research and specify the
conditions under which actors are more important than contexts for
innovation.
Discussion
We discussed five common perspectives on luck, each of which is tied to a par-
ticular literature. In addition to summarizing these literatures, we outlined
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several directions for future research. These ideas in combination may make
for a research agenda to help us further understand the role of luck in
management.
Our review should have made it clear that management researchers typi-
cally entertain quite different understandings of how luck interacts with
context and human intervention. These differences reflect the distinct
focuses of the subfields in management. First, luck as serendipity is mostly
studied by researchers in subfields such as Strategy and Entrepreneurship.
Their disciplinary background is often Economics, which tends to focus on
choice as the product of calculation, and of reasoning applied to predicament.
Thus, this perspective on luck as serendipity emphasizes how luck can be
tamed by actors’ wills. An attribution-based approach (luck as Attribution
and Undeserved) is utilized by researchers in subfields such as Organizational
Behavior and Judgment and Decision Making. Their disciplinary background
is often Psychology, which focuses on how perceptions happen and influence
behaviors. This perspective on luck as attributions emphasizes the cause and
consequences of the misperceptions of luck.
Last, the applications of luck as randomness or counterfactuals are mostly
used by researchers in subfields such as Organization Theory and Population
Ecology in the disciplinary background of Sociology, which focuses on how
choices are constrained by context. Thus, these two perspectives on luck as ran-
domness and counterfactual emphasize how observed outcomes are largely
determined by luck. In short, these perspectives on luck reflect varying assump-
tions about the actors’ degrees of freedom in outcomes: from a high degree
(luck as serendipity), to a moderate degree (luck as attributions or undeserved),
and to a low degree (luck as randomness or counterfactuals). One perspective
on luck does not necessarily represent reality more accurately than the others.
Instead, these diversified understandings of luck are desirable for an interdis-
ciplinary field such as management.
This review also suggests an important similarity among the different views
of luck: most suggest that misperceptions of luck are most problematic when
evaluating exceptional performances. Research suggests that top performances
can indicate luck and lower levels of skill because extreme performances are
more likely to result from extreme circumstances (Denrell & Liu, 2012). This
is particularly true for corporate stars whose skill does not differ much and
their outcomes are largely determined by situational factors. Nevertheless, cor-
porate stars and their performances tend to attract media attention and many
conclude that these outliers must have done something right to achieve their
status. This discrepancy contributes to various problems, in particular
increased social inequality and endangering the belief in a just world
(Piketty, 2014).
Luck may be one possible solution to the problem of increasing social
inequality. This suggests an underexplored perspective on luck: luck as a
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Leveler. This idea originates from the ancient Greek and Venetian Republic,
known as Demarchy or Lottocracy, where political leaders were elected not
by merit but by selected at random (Zeitoun, Osterloh, & Frey, 2014).
Recent studies show that random selection can actually outperform more
sophisticated governance mechanisms in politics and financial markets, due
to perceptions of fairness, resistance to corruption, and robustness in compari-
son to other approaches (Biondo, Pluchino, Rapisarda, & Helbing, 2013; Plu-
chino, Rapisarda, & Garofalo, 2010).
Random selection is particularly relevant for evaluating exceptional suc-
cesses, including those of star performers in corporate life. As we have seen
there may only be small differences in skill among corporate stars which, in
turn, would seem to imply that beyond a certain corporate level, randomly
selected executives are likely to perform as well as their higher performing
counterparts. Presumably, a company would not need to pay any randomly
selected executives as highly for three reasons: firstly, random selection may
be a more robust approach when other approaches tend to be subject to
biases such as Halo Effect and stereotype (Thorngate, Dawes, & Foddy,
2008); secondly, the randomly selected executives are chosen on the basis of
luck of the draw so the one being picked has no ground to ask for more
than his counterpart who also perform above a certain level; thirdly, extrinsic
incentives may not matter much for the output at higher corporate levels.
Paying the highest ranked corporate executives can in fact backfire by, for
example, making them less creative (Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, & Mazar,
2009). The firm may well spend the additional resources made available
from this approach for more useful applications such as research and develop-
ment. The resulting progress in innovation and technology may in turn
enhance “the rate of growth of income and output” and allow it catch up
with “the private rate of return on capital”, one of the few possible approaches
to attenuate social inequality (Piketty, 2014). This can also attenuate the divide
between the richest and the rest, maintaining a belief in a just word and its
function. Of course, this proposal of implementing random selection needs
to developed, but promises an alternative solution to a serious problem and
deserves more attention from management researchers. A difficulty with
random selection of corporate leaders is, of course, that those being led
might have less reason to be confident about their leaders’ ability to direct
their efforts in the best possible way. Lack of confidence in leadership might,
in turn, become a self-fulfilling prophecy, causing firms to underperform.
Assuming that the damages resulted from overconfidence is greater than
that from underconfidence, luck as leveler can still work well. Thus, randomly
selecting executives from a pool of qualified candidates is more effective than
selecting the highest performers, and this is particularly effective for the highest
ranked corporate positions such as CEOs.
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What is the implication of these perspectives on luck for management edu-
cation? Misperceptions of luck, particularly when evaluating exceptional suc-
cesses, have important implications for how we educate the next generation
of managers. Many bestsellers in management and case studies in business
school education focus on the top performers and how to move from “good
to great”. As these perspectives on luck suggest, there are no rules for becoming
the richest and luck dominates the outcome beyond a certain level. This implies
that preaching how to move from good to great is likely to lead to disappoint-
ment or even encourage excessive risk taking, fraud even, because exceptional
performances are unlikely to be achieved otherwise. Instead, management
research and education should focus more on less extreme performances,
that is, the second best, and strive to increase learning from failures, where
skill and effort matter more in determining outcomes. We should stop
showing our students how a limited number of stars have risen to levels that
others are unlikely to achieve. Rather we should present more realistic and
potentially beneficial lessons such as how people can move from incompetent
to okay.
Concluding Thoughts
In this paper we reviewed five common ways in which luck is used in the man-
agement and organizations literature: (a) luck as Attribution; (b) luck as Ran-
domness; (c) luck as Counterfactual; (d) luck as Undeserved; and (e) luck as
Serendipity. Each of these five perspectives is tied to a specific literature—
whether within management, or in such allied disciplines as economics, psy-
chology and sociology—and generative in terms of future research. We
added a sixth perspective, luck as Leveler, to address the specific issues of
executive compensation and social inequality. Our review suggests that man-
agers and their stakeholders tend to develop illusions that the world is more
controllable and predictable than it actually is, and these illusions can entail
costly errors in modern societies. This is the bad news. The good news is
that we have the conceptual tools to help us to better understand the role of
luck in organizational life, and thus to counter these illusions. We would
hope a community of scholars would join us to further develop these tools
in pursuit of what remains one of the thorniest issues in the management
and organizations literature. To this end, good luck to us all.
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Notes
1. We thank one of the reviewers for pointing out this interesting direction.
2. Merton (1968) coined this term from Gospel of Matthew: “For to all those who
have, more will be given, and they will have an abundance; but from those who
have nothing, even what they have will be taken away”. "Matthew 25:29, New
Revised Standard Version.
3. We thank one of the reviewers for the suggestion of separating this perspective on
luck from others.
4. This example is adapted from a now classic example Nagel (1976) developed: two
law-abiding drivers, one of whom experienced an unexpected and uncontrollable
event-a young child running in front of the car and this driver hit and killed the
girl whereas the other driver arrived the destination uneventfully. Philosophers
ask: should we blame the former driver more than the latter one? Our adapted
example happens in typical management context but the essence is identical to
the one developed by Nagel (1976).
References
Alchian, A. (1950). Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory. Journal of Political
Economy, 58(3), 211–221.
Aldrich, H. (1979). Organizations and environment. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-
Hall.
Alesina, A., Glaeser, E., & Sacerdote, B. (2001). Why doesn’t the US have a
European-style welfare system? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3(1),
1–66.
Alvesson, M., & Sandberg, J. (2011). Generating research questions through problema-
tization. Academy of Management Review, 36(2), 247–271.
Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem. London: Penguin.
Ariely, D., Gneezy, U., Loewenstein, G., & Mazar, N. (2009). Large stakes and big mis-
takes. Review of Economic Studies, 76(2), 451–469.
Armstrong, J. S., & Collopy, F. (1992). Error measures for generalizing about forecasting
methods: Empirical comparisons. International Journal of Forecasting, 8(1),
69–80.
Arthur, B. W. (1989). Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by his-
torical events. The Economic Journal, 99, 116–131.
Asch, S. E. (1951). Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of
judgments. In H. Guetzkow (Ed.), Groups, leadership, and men (pp. 222–236).
Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press.
Austin, J. H. (1978). Chase, chance, and creativity: The lucky art of novelty. New York,
NY: Columbia University Press.
34 † The Academy of Management Annals
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
mb
rid
ge
] a
t 0
4:2
0 0
4 A
pri
l 2
01
6 
Ayton, P., & Fischer, I. (2004). The hot hand fallacy and the gambler’s fallacy: Two faces
of subjective randomness? Memory & Cognition, 32(8), 1369–1378.
Barnett, W. P. (2008). The red queen among organizations: How competitiveness evolves.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Barnett, W. P., & Hansen, M. T. (1996). The red queen in organizational evolution.
Strategic Management Journal, 17(7), 139–157.
Barney, J. B. (1986). Strategic factor markets: Expectations, luck, and business strategy.
Management Science, 32(10), 1231–1241.
Barney, J. B. (1997). On flipping coins and making technology decisions: Luck on an
explanation of technological foresight and oversight. In R. Garud, P. R. Nayyar
& Z. B. Shapira (Eds.), Technological innovation oversights and foresights
(pp. 13–19). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Barnsley, R. H., Thompson, A. H., & Barnsley, P. E. (1985). Hockey success and birth-
date: The relative age effect. Canadian Association for Health, Physical Education,
and Recreation Journal, 51(1), 23–28.
Baron, J., & Hershey, J. C. (1988). Outcome bias in decision evaluation. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 54(4), 569–579.
Beaver, W. H. (1968). The information content of annual earnings announcements.
Journal of Accounting Research, 19(1), 67–92.
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2009). Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise
of executive compensation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006). Belief in a just world and redistributive politics.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2), 699–746.
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001). Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones
without principals are. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(3), 901–932.
Biondo, A. E., Pluchino, A., Rapisarda, A., & Helbing, D. (2013). Are random trading
strategies more successful than technical ones? PLoS ONE, 8(7), e68344. doi:10.
1371/journal.pone.0068344
Boeker, W. (1992). Power and managerial dismissal: Scapegoating at the top.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(3), 400–421.
Burgelman, R. A. (2003). Practice and you get luckier. European Business Forum, 1(16),
38–39.
Byrne, R. (2005). The rational imagination: How people create alternatives to reality.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Camerer, C., & Lovallo, D. A. N. (1999). Overconfidence and excess entry: An exper-
imental approach. American Economic Review, 89(1), 306–318.
Camerer, C. F., Ho, T.-H., & Chong, J.-K. (2004). A cognitive hierarchy model of games.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(3), 861–898.
Carroll, G. R., & Harrison, J. R. (1994). On the historical efficiency of competition between
organizational populations. American Journal of Sociology, 100(3), 720–749.
Cattani, G. (2005). Preadaptation, firm heterogeneity, and technological performance: A
study on the evolution of fiber optics, 1970–1995. Organization Science, 16(6),
563–580.
Cattani, G. (2006). Technological pre-adaptation, speciation, and emergence of new
technologies: How corning invented and developed fiber optics. Industrial &
Corporate Change, 15(2), 285–318.
Centola, D., & Macy, M. (2007). Complex contagions and the weakness of long ties.
American Journal of Sociology, 113(3), 702–734.
Good Night, and Good Luck † 35
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
mb
rid
ge
] a
t 0
4:2
0 0
4 A
pri
l 2
01
6 
Chung, K. H., & Cox, R. A. K. (1994). A stochastic model of superstardom: An application
of the Yule distribution. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(4), 771–775.
Coad, A. (2009). The growth of firms: A survey of theories and empirical evidence.
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Cohen, M. D., March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1972). A garbage can model of organizational
choice. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(1), 1–25.
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on
learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128–152.
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1994). Fortune favors the prepared firm.
Management Science, 40(2), 227–251.
Collins, J., & Hansen, M. T. (2011). Great by choice: Uncertainty, chaos and luck—why
some thrive despite them all. London: Random House.
Cornelissen, J., & Durand, R. (2012). More than just novelty: Conceptual blending and
causality. Academy of Management Review, 37(1), 152–154.
Cowley, R. (2002). What if? London: Penguin.
Cowley, R. (2003). More what if? Eminent historians imagine what might have been.
London: Pan Macmillan.
Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.
Darke, P. R., & Freedman, J. L. (1997). Lucky events and beliefs in luck: Paradoxical
effects on confidence and risk-taking. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 23(1), 378–388.
David, P. A. (1985). Clio and the economics of QWERTY. American Economic Review,
75(2), 332–337.
Day, L., & Maltby, J. (2003). Belief in good luck and psychological well-being: The med-
iating role of optimism and irrational beliefs. Journal of Psychology, 137(1), 99–110.
Denrell, J. (2003). Vicarious learning, undersampling of failure, and the myths of man-
agement. Organization Science, 14(3), 227–243.
Denrell, J. (2004). Random walks and sustained competitive advantage. Management
Science, 50(7), 922–934.
Denrell, J. (2008). Organizational risk taking: Adaptation versus variable risk prefer-
ences. Industrial & Corporate Change, 17(3), 427–466.
Denrell, J., & Fang, C. (2010). Predicting the next big thing: Success as a signal of poor
judgment. Management Science, 56(10), 1653–1667.
Denrell, J., Fang, C., & Liu, C. (2015). Chance explanations in the management sciences.
Organization Science, 26(3), 923–940.
Denrell, J., Fang, C., & Winter, S. G. (2003). The economics of strategic opportunity.
Strategic Management Journal, 24(10), 977–990.
Denrell, J., Fang, C., & Zhao, Z. (2013). Inferring superior capabilities from sustained
superior performance: A Bayesian analysis. Strategic Management Journal,
34(2), 182–196.
Denrell, J., & Liu, C. (2012). Top performers are not the most impressive when extreme
performance indicates unreliability. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 109(24), 9331–9336.
Denrell, J., & Shapira, Z. (2009). Performance sampling and bimodal duration depen-
dence. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 33(1), 38–63.
de Rond, M. (2014). The structure of serendipity. Culture and Organization, 20(5), 342–
358.
36 † The Academy of Management Annals
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
mb
rid
ge
] a
t 0
4:2
0 0
4 A
pri
l 2
01
6 
de Rond, M. & Morley, I. (Eds.). (2010). Serendipity. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
de Rond, M. & Thietart, R.-A. (2007). Choice, chance, and inevitability in strategy.
Strategic Management Journal, 28(5), 535–551.
Dew, N. (2009). Serendipity in entrepreneurship. Organization Studies, 30(7), 735–753.
Dierickx, I., & Cool, K. (1989). Asset stock accumulation and sustainability of competi-
tive advantage. Management Science, 35(12), 1504–1511.
Dillon, R. L., & Tinsley, C. H. (2008). How near-misses influence decision making under
risk: A missed opportunity for learning. Management Science, 54(8), 1425–1440.
DiPrete, T. A., Eirich, G. M., & Pittinsky, M. (2010). Compensation benchmarking,
leapfrogs, and the surge in executive pay. American Journal of Sociology,
115(6), 1671–1712.
Dolan, P., Hallsworth, M., Halpern, D., King, D., Metcalfe, R., & Vlaev, I. (2012).
Influencing behaviour: The mindspace way. Journal of Economic Psychology,
33(1), 264–277.
Durand, R. (2003). Predicting a firm’s forecasting ability: The roles of organizational
illusion of control and organizational attention. Strategic Management Journal,
24(9), 821–838.
Durand, R., & Vaara, E. (2009). Causation, counterfactuals and competitive advantage.
Strategic Management Journal, 30(12), 1245–1264.
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. The
Journal of Finance, 25(2), 383–417.
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. The Journal of Political
Economy, 88(2), 288–307.
Fang, C., Lee, J., & Schilling, M. A. (2010). Balancing exploration and exploitation
through structural design: The isolation of subgroups and organizational learning.
Organization Science, 21(3), 625–642.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7(2),
117–140.
Fildes, R., Goodwin, P., Lawrence, M., & Nikolopoulos, K. (2009). Effective forecasting
and judgmental adjustments: An empirical evaluation and strategies for improve-
ment in supply-chain planning. International Journal of Forecasting, 25(1), 3–23.
Fischhoff, B. (1975). Hindsight not equal to foresight: Effect of outcome knowledge on
judgment under uncertainty. Journal of Experimental Psychology-Human
Perception and Performance, 1(3), 288–299.
Fitza, M. A. (2014). The use of variance decomposition in the investigation of CEO
effects: How large must the CEO effect be to rule out chance? Strategic
Management Journal, 31(11), 1839–1852.
Frank, R. H., & Cook, P. J. (1995). The winner-take-all society. New York, NY: Free Press.
Gates, B. (1995). The road ahead. New York, NY: Viking.
Geroski, P. A. (2005). Understanding the implications of empirical work on corporate
growth rates. Managerial and Decision Economics, 26(2), 129–138.
Giambatista, R. C., Rowe, W. G., & Riaz, S. (2005). Nothing succeeds like succession: A
critical review of leader succession literature since 1994. The Leadership
Quarterly, 16(6), 963–991.
Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. Psychological Bulletin,
117(1), 21–38.
Good Night, and Good Luck † 37
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
mb
rid
ge
] a
t 0
4:2
0 0
4 A
pri
l 2
01
6 
Gilovich, T., Vallone, R., & Tversky, A. (1985). The hot hand in basketball: On the mis-
perception of random sequences. Cognitive Psychology, 17(3), 295–314.
Gimpl, M. L., & Dakin, S. R. (1984). Management and magic. California Management
Review, 27(1), 125–136.
Gladwell, M. (2008). Outliers: The story of success. London: Allen Lane.
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002). Models of ecological rationality: The recog-
nition heuristic. Psychological Review, 109(1), 75–90.
Gould, R. V. (2002). The origins of status hierarchies: A formal theory and empirical
test. American Journal of Sociology, 107(5), 1143–1178.
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology,
78(6), 1360–1380.
Gromet, D. M., Hartson, K. A., & Sherman, D. K. (2015). The politics of luck: Political
ideology and the perceived relationship between luck and success. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 59, 40–46.
Hambrick, D. C., & Finkelstein, S. (1987). Managerial discretion: A bridge between
polar views of organizational outcomes. Research in Organizational Behavior,
9(1), 369–406.
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1984). Structural inertia and organizational change.
American Sociological Review, 49(2), 149–164.
Hannan, M. T., & Freeman, J. (1989). Organizational ecology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Hannan, M. T., Po´los, L., & Carroll, G. R. (2003). Cascading organizational change.
Organization Science, 14(5), 463–482.
Harrison, J. R., & March, J. G. (1984). Decision making and postdecision surprises.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 29(1), 26–42.
Henderson, A. D., Raynor, M. E., & Ahmed, M. (2012). How long must a firm be great
to rule out chance? Benchmarking sustained superior performance without being
fooled by randomness. Strategic Management Journal, 33(4), 387–406.
Herndon, T., Ash, M., & Pollin, R. (2014). Does high public debt consistently stifle econ-
omic growth? A critique of Reinhart and Rogoff. Cambridge Journal of Economics,
38(2), 257–279.
Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E. U., & Erev, I. (2004). Decisions from experience and
the effect of rare events in risky choice. Psychological Science, 15(8), 534–539.
Hewstone, M. (1989). Causal attribution: From cognitive processes to collective beliefs.
London: Wiley-Blackwell.
Hilary, G., & Menzly, L. (2006). Does past success lead analysts to become overconfi-
dent? Management Science, 52(4), 489–500.
Hilbert, M. (2012). Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: How noisy information pro-
cessing can bias human decision making. Psychological Bulletin, 138(2), 1–27.
Hogarth, R. M., & Makridakis, S. (1981). Forecasting and planning: An evaluation.
Management Science, 27(2), 115–138.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4),
305–360.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. London: Penguin.
Kahneman, D., & Lovallo, D. (1993). Timid choices and bold forecasts: A cognitive per-
spective on risk taking. Management Science, 39(1), 17–31.
38 † The Academy of Management Annals
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
mb
rid
ge
] a
t 0
4:2
0 0
4 A
pri
l 2
01
6 
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alterna-
tives. Psychological Review, 93(2), 136–153.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment under cncertainty: Heuristics
and biases. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological
Review, 80(4), 237–251.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). The simulation heuristic. In D. Kahneman, P.
Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases
(pp. 201–208). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Kelley, H. H. (1971). Attribution in social interaction. New York, NY: General Learning
Corporation.
Khurana, R. (2002). Searching for a corporate sSavior: The irrational quest for charis-
matic CEOs. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Langer, E. J. (1975). Illusion of control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
32(2), 311–328.
Langer, E. J. (1989). Mindfulness. Cambride, MA: Addison-Wesley Reading.
Lee, J., Boatwright, P., & Kamakura, W. A. (2003). A Bayesian model for prelaunch sales
forecasting of recorded music. Management Science, 49(2), 179–196.
Levinthal, D. A. (1991). Random walks and organizational mortality. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 36(3), 397–420.
Levitt, B., & Nass, C. (1989). The lid on the garbage can: Institutional constraints on
decision making in the technical core of college-text publishers. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 34(2), 190–207.
Levy, M. (2003). Are rich people smarter? Journal of Economic Theory, 110(1), 42–64.
Lewis, M. M. (2003). Moneyball: The art of winning an unfair game. New York, NY:
WW Norton.
Lieberman, M. B., & Montgomery, D. B. (1988). 1st-mover advantages. Strategic
Management Journal, 9, 41–58.
Lippman, S. A., & Rumelt, R. P. (1982). Uncertain imitability: An analysis of interfirm
differences in efficiency under competition. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2),
418–438.
Liu, C., Eubanks, D., & Chater, N. (2015). Weakness of strong ties: Decision biases,
social ties and nepotism in family business succession. Leadership Quarterly,
26(1), 419–435.
Lorenz, J., Rauhut, H., Schweitzer, F., & Helbing, D. (2011). How social influence can
undermine the wisdom of crowd effect. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 108(22), 9020–9025.
Lowe, R. A., & Ziedonis, A. A. (2006). Overoptimism and the performance of entrepre-
neurial firms. Management Science, 52(2), 173–186.
Lynn, F. B., Podolny, J. M., & Tao, L. (2009). A sociological (de)construction of the
relationship between status and quality. American Journal of Sociology, 115(3),
755–804.
MacKay, R. B. (2007). What if?: Synthesizing debates and advancing prospects of using
virtual history in management and organization theory. Management &
Organizational History, 2(4), 295–314.
Madsen, P. M., & Desai, V. (2010). Failing to learn? The effects of failure and success on
organizational learning in the global orbital launch vehicle industry. Academy of
Management Journal, 53(3), 451–476.
Good Night, and Good Luck † 39
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
mb
rid
ge
] a
t 0
4:2
0 0
4 A
pri
l 2
01
6 
Makadok, R., & Barney, J. B. (2001). Strategic factor market intelligence: An application
of information economics to strategy formulation and competitor intelligence.
Management Science, 47(12), 1621–1638.
Maltby, J., Day, L., Gill, P., Colley, A., & Wood, A. M. (2008). Beliefs around luck:
Confirming the empirical conceptualization of beliefs around luck and the devel-
opment of the Darke and Freedman beliefs around luck scale. Personality and
Individual Differences, 45(7), 655–660.
March, J. C., & March, J. G. (1977). Almost random careers: The Wisconsin school
superintendency, 1940–1972. Administrative Science Quarterly, 22(3), 377–409.
March, J. G. (2006). Rationality, foolishness, and adaptive intelligence. Strategic
Management Journal, 27(3), 201–214.
March, J. G. (2010). The ambiguities of experience. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
March, J. G., Sproull, L. S., & Tamuz, M. (1991). Learning from samples of one or fewer.
Organization Science, 2(1), 1–13.
Mauboussin, M. J. (2012). The success equation: Untangling skill and luck in business,
sports and investing. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
McGahan, A. M., & Porter, M. E. (2002). What do we know about variance in account-
ing profitability? Management Science, 48(7), 834–851.
Meindl, J. R., Ehrlich, S. B., & Dukerich, J. M. (1985). The romance of leadership.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 30(1), 78–102.
Merton, R. K. (1968). The matthew effect in science: The reward and communication
systems of science. Science, 159(3810), 55–63.
Merton, R. K., & Barber, E. (2004). The travels and adventures of serendipity. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Michaelson, C. (2008). Moral luck and business ethics. Journal of Business Ethics, 83(4),
773–787.
Milgrom, P. R. (1981). Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and appli-
cations. The Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), 380–391.
Miller, D. T., & Ross, M. (1975). Self-serving biases in the attribution of causality: Fact or
fiction? Psychological Bulletin, 82(2), 213–225.
Miner, A. S. (1987). Idiosyncratic jobs in formalized organizations. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 32(3), 327–351.
Mintzberg, H., Pascale, R. T., Rumelt, R. P., & Goold, M. (1996). The “Honda effect”
revisited. California Management Review, 38(4), 78–79.
Mintzberg, H., & Waters, J. A. (1985). Of strategies, deliberate and emergent. Strategic
Management Journal, 6(3), 257–272.
Musch, J., & Grondin, S. (2001). Unequal competition as an impediment to personal
development: A review of the relative age effect in sport. Developmental
Review, 21(2), 147–167.
Nagel, T. (1976). Moral luck. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 76(1), 136–150.
Nelson, F., & Winter, S. (1982). An evolutionary theory of economic change. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inferences: Strategies and shortcomings of social
judgments. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Page, S. E. (2006). Path dependence. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1(1), 87–115.
Pascale, R. T. (1996). Reflections on Honda. California Management Review, 38(4),
112–117.
40 † The Academy of Management Annals
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
mb
rid
ge
] a
t 0
4:2
0 0
4 A
pri
l 2
01
6 
Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accidents: Living with high risk technologies. New York, NY:
Basic Books.
Perrow, C. (2011). The next catastrophe: Reducing our vulnerabilities to natural, indus-
trial, and terrorist disasters. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (1978). The external control of organizations. New York, NY:
Harper.
Pierson, K., Addona, V., & Yates, P. (2014). A behavioural dynamic model of the relative
age effect. Journal of Sports Sciences, 32(8), 776–784.
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Pizarro, D., Uhlmann, E., & Salovey, P. (2003). Asymmetry in judgments of moral
blame and praise: The role of perceived metadesires. Psychological Science,
14(3), 267–272.
Pluchino, A., Rapisarda, A., & Garofalo, C. (2010). The Peter principle revisited: A com-
putational study. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 389(3),
467–472.
Porter, M. E. (1991). Toward a dynamic theory of strategy. Strategic Management
Journal, 12(S2), 95–117.
Powell, T. C. (2003). Varieties of competitive parity. Strategic Management Journal,
24(1), 61–86.
Powell, T. C., & Arregle, J.-L. (2007). Firm performance and the axis of errors. Journal of
Management Research, 7(2), 59–77.
Powell, T. C., Lovallo, D., & Caringal, C. (2006). Causal ambiguity, management percep-
tion, and firm performance. Academy of Management Review, 31(1), 175–196.
Powell, T. C., Lovallo, D., & Fox, C. R. (2011). Behavioral strategy. Strategic
Management Journal, 32(13), 1369–1386.
Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pritchard, D. (2006). Moral and epistemic luck. Metaphilosophy, 37(1), 1–25.
Pritchard, D. H., & Smith, M. (2004). The psychology and philosophy of luck.New Ideas
in Psychology, 22(1), 1–28.
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2010). Growth in a time of debt. American Economic
Review, 100(2), 573–578.
Rescher, N. (1995). Luck: The brilliant randomness of everyday life. Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press.
Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human
evolution. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Roberts, R. M. (1989). Serendipity. New York, NY: Wiley.
Roese, N. J., & Olson, J. M. (1995).What might have been: The social psychology of coun-
terfactual thinking. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Rosenzweig, P. (2007). Misunderstanding the nature of company performance: The halo
effect and other business delusions. California Management Review, 49(4), 6–20.
Ross, L., & Nisbett, R. E. (1991). The person and the situation: Perspectives of social psy-
chology. London: McGraw-Hill.
Rudolph, J. W., & Repenning, N. P. (2002). Disaster dynamics: Understanding the role of
quantity in organizational collapse.Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(1), 1–30.
Rumelt, R. P. (1991). How much does industry matter? Strategic Management Journal,
12(3), 167–185.
Good Night, and Good Luck † 41
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
mb
rid
ge
] a
t 0
4:2
0 0
4 A
pri
l 2
01
6 
Runde, J., & de Rond, M. (2010). Assessing causal explanations of particular events.
Organization Studies, 31(4), 431–450.
Salganik, M. J., Dodds, P. S., &Watts, D. J. (2006). Experimental study of inequality and
unpredictability in an artificial cultural market. Science, 311(5762), 854–856.
Samuelson, P. A. (1965). Proof that properly anticipated prices fluctuate randomly.
Industrial Management Review, 6(2), 41–49.
Samuelson, P. A. (1989). The judgment of economic science on rational portfolio man-
agement. The Journal of Portfolio Management, 16(1), 4–12.
Schilling, M. A., & Fang, C. (2013). When hubs forget, lie, and play favorites:
Interpersonal network structure, information distortion, and organizational
learning. Strategic Management Journal, 35(7), 974–994.
Schwab, A., Abrahamson, E., Starbuck, W. H., & Fidler, F. (2011). Perspective—
researchers should make thoughtful assessments instead of null-hypothesis sig-
nificance tests. Organization Science, 22(4), 1105–1120.
Shane, S. A. (2008). The illusions of entrepreneurship: The costly myths that entrepre-
neurs, investors, and policy makers live by. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Simonton, D. K. (2003). Scientific creativity as constrained stochastic behavior: The
integration of product, person, and process perspectives. Psychological Bulletin,
129(4), 475–494.
Small, M. L. (2009). Unanticipated gains: Origins of network inequality in everyday life:
Origins of network inequality in everyday life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Starbuck, W. H. (1994). On behalf of naivete. In J. Baum & J. Singh (Eds.), Evolutionary
dynamics of organizations (pp. 205–220). New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Starbuck, W. H., & Farjoun, M. (2005). Organization at the limit: Lessons from the
Columbia disaster. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Strang, D., & Macy, M. W. (2001). In search of excellence: Fads, success stories, and
adaptive emulation. American Journal of Sociology, 107(1), 147–182.
Syverson, C. (2011). What determines productivity? Journal of Economic Literature,
49(2), 326–365.
Taleb, N. N. (2001). Fooled by randomness: The hidden role of chance in life and in the
markets. London: Penguin.
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. (1997). Dynamic capabilities and strategic manage-
ment. Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 509–533.
Teigen, K. H. (2005). When a small difference makes a large difference: Counterfactual
thinking and luck. In D. Mandel, D. Hilton, & P. Catelani (Eds.), The psychology of
counterfactual thinking (pp. 130–146). London: Routledge.
Tetlock, P. E., & Belkin, A. (1996). Counterfactual thought experiments in world politics:
Logical, methodological, and psychological perspectives. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth,
and happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Thorngate, W. (1988). On the evolution of adjudicated contests and the principle of
invidious. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 1(1), 5–15.
Thorngate, W., Dawes, R., & Foddy, M. (2008). Judging merit. New York, NY:
Psychology Press.
Tinsley, C. H., Dillon, R. L., & Cronin, M. A. (2012). How near-miss events amplify or
attenuate risky decision making. Management Science, 58(9), 1596–1613.
42 † The Academy of Management Annals
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
mb
rid
ge
] a
t 0
4:2
0 0
4 A
pri
l 2
01
6 
Tsang, E. W., & Ellsaesser, F. (2011). How contrastive explanation facilitates theory
building. Academy of Management Review, 36(2), 404–419.
Tsang, E. W. K. (2004a). Superstition and decision-making: Contradiction or comp-
lement? Academy of Management Executive, 18(4), 92–104.
Tsang, E. W. K. (2004b). Toward a scientific inquiry into superstitious business
decision-making. Organization Studies, 25(6), 923–946.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131.
Uhlmann, E. L., Pizarro, D. A., & Diermeier, D. (2015). A person-centered approach to
moral judgment. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 10(1), 72–81.
Vaughan, D. (1997). The challenger launch decision: Risky technology, culture, and
deviance at NASA. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Velamuri, S. R., & Dew, N. (2010). Evolutionary processes, moral luck, and the ethical
responsibilities of the manager. Journal of Business Ethics, 91(1), 113–126.
Vergne, J. P., & Durand, R. (2009). The missing link between the theory and empirics of
path dependence: Conceptual clarification, testability issue, and methodological
implications. Journal of Management Studies, 47(4), 736–759.
Wade, J. B., O’Reilly, C. A., & Pollock, T. G. (2006). Overpaid CEOs and underpaid
managers: Fairness and executive compensation. Organization Science, 17(5),
527–544.
Weick, K., Sutcliffe, K., & Obstfeld, D. (1999). Organizing for high reliability: Processes
of collective mindfulness. Research in Organizational Behavior, 21(1), 23–81.
Weick, K. E., & Sutcliffe, B. T. (2006).Managing the unexpected: Assuring high perform-
ance in an age of complexity. London: John Wiley & Sons.
Weiner, B., Frieze, I., Kukla, A., Reed, L., Rest, S., & Rosenbaum, R. M. (1971). Perceiving
the cause of success and failure. New York, NY: General Learning Press.
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal,
5(2), 171–180.
Wiersema, M. F., & Bantel, K. A. (2006). Top management team turnover as an adap-
tation mechanism: The role of the environment. Strategic Management Journal,
14(7), 485–504.
Williamson, B. (1981). Moral luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Winter, S. G. (2003). Understanding dynamic capabilities. Strategic Management
Journal, 24(10), 991–995.
Young, L., Nichols, S., & Saxe, R. (2010). Investigating the neural and cognitive basis of
moral luck: It’s not what you do but what you know. Review of Philosophy and
Psychology, 1(3), 333–349.
Zeitoun, H., Osterloh, M., & Frey, B. S. (2014). Learning from ancient Athens:
Demarchy and corporate governance. The Academy of Management
Perspectives, 28(1), 1–14.
Good Night, and Good Luck † 43
Do
wn
loa
de
d b
y [
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
mb
rid
ge
] a
t 0
4:2
0 0
4 A
pri
l 2
01
6 
